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Abstract
We study the security of communication between a single transmitter and multiple
receivers in a broadcast channel in the presence of an eavesdropper. Characterizing
the secrecy capacity region of this channel in its most general form is difficult, because
the version of this problem without any secrecy constraints, is the broadcast channel
with an arbitrary number of receivers, whose capacity region is open. Consequently,
to have progress in understanding secure broadcasting, we resort to studying several
special classes of channels, with increasing generality. As the first model, we consider
the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel where the legitimate receivers exhibit a
degradedness order while the eavesdropper is more noisy with respect to all legitimate
receivers. We establish the secrecy capacity region of this channel model. Secondly,
we consider the parallel multi-receiver wiretap channel with a less noisiness order in
each sub-channel, where this order is not necessarily the same for all sub-channels.
Consequently, this parallel multi-receiver wiretap channel is not as restrictive as the
degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel, because the overall channel does not exhibit a
degradedness or even a less noisiness order. We establish the common message secrecy
capacity and sum secrecy capacity of this channel. Thirdly, we study a special class of
parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels and provide a stronger result. In particular, we
study the case with two sub-channels two users and one eavesdropper, where there is a
degradedness order in each sub-channel such that in the first (resp. second) sub-channel
the second (resp. first) receiver is degraded with respect to the first (resp. second)
receiver, while the eavesdropper is degraded with respect to both legitimate receivers
in both sub-channels. We determine the secrecy capacity region of this channel, and
discuss its extensions to arbitrary numbers of users and sub-channels. Finally, we focus
on a variant of this previous channel model where the transmitter can use only one
of the sub-channels at any time. We characterize the secrecy capacity region of this
channel as well.
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CCF 04-47613, CCF 05-14846, CNS 07-16311 and CCF 07-
29127, and was presented in part at the 42nd Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers,
Pacific Grove, CA, October 2008 [1].
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1 Introduction
Information theoretic secrecy was initiated by Wyner in his seminal work [2] where he intro-
duced the wiretap channel and established the capacity-equivocation region of the degraded
wiretap channel. Later, his result was generalized to arbitrary, not necessarily degraded,
wiretap channels by Csiszar and Korner [3]. Recently, many multiuser channel models have
been considered from a secrecy point of view [4–21]. One basic extension of the wiretap
channel to the multiuser environment is secure broadcasting to many users in the presence
of an eavesdropper. In the most general form of this problem (see Figure 1), one transmitter
wants to have confidential communication with an arbitrary number of users in a broadcast
channel, while this communication is being eavesdropped by an external entity. Our goal
is to understand the theoretical limits of secure broadcasting, i.e., largest simultaneously
achievable secure rates. Characterizing the secrecy capacity region of this channel model in
its most general form is difficult, because the version of this problem without any secrecy
constraints, is the broadcast channel with an arbitrary number of receivers, whose capac-
ity region is open. Consequently, to have progress in understanding the limits of secure
broadcasting, we resort to studying several special classes of channels, with increasing gener-
ality. The approach of studying special channel structures was also followed in the existing
literature on secure broadcasting [9, 10].
Reference [10] first considers an arbitrary wiretap channel with two legitimate receivers
and one eavesdropper, and provides an inner bound for achievable rates when each user
wishes to receive an independent message. Secondly, [10] focuses on the degraded wiretap
channel with two receivers and one eavesdropper, where there is a degradedness order among
the receivers, and the eavesdropper is degraded with respect to both users (see Figure 2 for
a more general version of the problem that we study). For this setting, [10] finds the secrecy
capacity region. This result is concurrently and independently obtained in this work as a
special case, see Corollary 1, which is also published in a conference version in [1].
Another relevant work on secure broadcasting is [9] which considers secure broadcasting
to K users using M sub-channels (see Figure 3) for two different scenarios: In the first
scenario, the transmitter wants to convey only a common confidential message to all users,
and in the second scenario, the transmitter wants to send independent messages to all users.
For both scenarios, [9] considers a sub-class of parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels, where
in any given sub-channel there is a degradation order such that each receiver’s observation
(except the best one) is a degraded version of some other receiver’s observation, and this
degradation order is not necessarily the same for all sub-channels. For the first scenario, [9]
finds the common message secrecy capacity for this sub-class. For the second scenario, where
each user wishes to receive an independent message, [9] finds the sum secrecy capacity for
this sub-class of channels.
In this paper, our approach will be two-fold: First, we will identify more general channel
models than considered in [9,10] and generalize the results in [9,10] to those channel models,
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Figure 1: Secure broadcasting to many users in the presence of an eavesdropper.
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Figure 2: The degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel with a more noisy eavesdropper.
and secondly, we will consider somewhat more specialized channel models than in [9] and
provide more comprehensive results. More precisely, our contributions in this paper are:
1. We consider the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel with an arbitrary number
of users and one eavesdropper, where users are arranged according to a degraded-
ness order, and each user has a less noisy channel with respect to the eavesdropper,
see Figure 2. We find the secrecy capacity region when each user receives both an
independent message and a common message. Since degradedness implies less noisi-
ness [3], this channel model contains the sub-class of channel models where in addition
to the degradedness order users exhibit, the eavesdropper is degraded with respect to
all users. Consequently, our result can be specialized to the degraded multi-receiver
wiretap channel with an arbitrary number of users and a degraded eavesdropper, see
Corollary 1 and also [1]. The two-user version of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap
channel was studied and the capacity region was found independently and concurrently
in [10].
2. We then focus on a class of parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels with an arbitrary
number of legitimate receivers and an eavesdropper, see Figure 3, where in each sub-
channel, for any given user, either the user’s channel is less noisy with respect to
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Figure 3: The parallel multi-receiver wiretap channel.
the eavesdropper’s channel, or vice versa. We establish the common message secrecy
capacity of this channel, which is a generalization of the corresponding capacity result
in [9] to a broader class of channels. Secondly, we study the scenario where each
legitimate receiver wishes to receive an independent message for another sub-class of
parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels. For channels belonging to this sub-class, in
each sub-channel, there is a less noisiness order which is not necessarily the same for
all sub-channels. Consequently, this ordered class of channels is a subset of the class
for which we establish the common message secrecy capacity. We find the sum secrecy
capacity for this class, which is again a generalization of the corresponding result in [9]
to a broader class of channels.
3. We also investigate a class of parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels with two sub-
channels, two users and one eavesdropper, see Figure 4. For the channels in this class,
there is a specific degradation order in each sub-channel such that in the first (resp.
second) sub-channel the second (resp. first) user is degraded with respect to the first
(resp. second) user, while the eavesdropper is degraded with respect to both users in
both sub-channels. This is the model of [9] for K = 2 users and M = 2 sub-channels.
This model is more restrictive compared to the one mentioned in the previous item.
Our motivation to study this more special class is to provide a stronger and more
comprehensive result. In particular, for this class, we determine the entire secrecy
capacity region when each user receives both an independent message and a common
message. In contrast, [9] gives the common message secrecy capacity (when only a
common message is transmitted) and sum secrecy capacity (when only independent
messages are transmitted) of this class. We discuss the generalization of this result to
arbitrary numbers of users and sub-channels.
4. We finally consider a variant of the previous channel model. In this model, we again
have a parallel multi-receiver wiretap channel with two sub-channels, two users and
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Figure 4: The parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel.
one eavesdropper, and the degradation order in each sub-channel is exactly the same
as in the previous item. However, in this case, the input and output alphabets of
one sub-channel are non-intersecting with the input and output alphabets of the other
sub-channel. Moreover, we can use only one of these sub-channels at any time. We
determine the secrecy capacity region of this channel when the transmitter sends both
an independent message to each receiver and a common message to both receivers.
2 Degraded Multi-receiver Wiretap Channels
We first consider the generalization of Wyner’s degraded wiretap channel to the case with
many legitimate receivers. In particular, the channel consists of a transmitter with an input
alphabet x ∈ X , K legitimate receivers with output alphabets yk ∈ Yk, k = 1, . . . , K, and an
eavesdropper with output alphabet z ∈ Z. The transmitter sends a confidential message to
each user, say wk ∈ Wk to the kth user, in addition to a common message, w0 ∈ W0, which
is to be delivered to all users. All messages are to be kept secret from the eavesdropper. The
channel is assumed to be memoryless with a transition probability p(y1, y2, . . . , yK, z|x).
In this section, we consider a special class of these channels, see Figure 2, where users
exhibit a certain degradation order, i.e., their channel outputs satisfy the following Markov
chain
X → YK → . . .→ Y1 (1)
and each user has a less noisy channel with respect to the eavesdropper, i.e., we have
I(U ; Yk) > I(U ;Z) (2)
for every U such that U → X → (Yk, Z). In fact, since a degradation order exists among
the users, it is sufficient to say that user 1 has a less noisy channel with respect to the
eavesdropper to guarantee that all users do. Hereafter, we call this channel the degraded
multi-receiver wiretap channel with a more noisy eavesdropper. We note that this channel
model contains the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel which is defined through the
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Markov chain
X → YK → . . .→ Y1 → Z (3)
because the Markov chain in (3) implies the less noisiness condition in (2).
A (2nR0, 2nR1, . . . , 2nRK , n) code for this channel consists of K + 1 message sets, Wk =
{1, . . . , 2nRk}, k = 0, 1, . . . , K, an encoder f : W0 × . . . × WK → X
n, K decoders, one at
each legitimate receiver, gk : Yk → W0 × Wk, k = 1, . . . , K. The probability of error is
defined as P ne = maxk=1,...,K Pr [gk(Y
n
k ) 6= (W0,Wk)]. A rate tuple (R0, R1, . . . , RK) is said
to be achievable if there exists a code with limn→∞ P
n
e = 0 and
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(S(W )|Zn) ≥
∑
k∈S(W )
Rk, ∀ S(W ) (4)
where S(W ) denotes any subset of {W0,W1, . . . ,WK}. Hence, we consider only perfect
secrecy rates. The secrecy capacity region is defined as the closure of all achievable rate
tuples.
The secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel with a more
noisy eavesdropper is given by the following theorem whose proof is provided in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 1 The secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel
with a more noisy eavesdropper is given by the union of the rate tuples (R0, R1, . . . , RK)
satisfying
R0 +
ℓ∑
k=1
Rk ≤
ℓ∑
k=1
I(Uk; Yk|Uk−1)− I(Uℓ;Z), ℓ = 1, . . . , K (5)
where U0 = φ, UK = X , and the union is over all probability distributions of the form
p(u1)p(u2|u1) . . . p(uK−1|uK−2)p(x|uK−1) (6)
Remark 1 Theorem 1 implies that a modified version of superposition coding can achieve
the boundary of the capacity region. The difference between the superposition coding scheme
used to achieve (5) and the standard one [22] is that the former uses stochastic encoding
in each layer of the code to associate each message with many codewords. This controlled
amount of redundancy prevents the eavesdropper from being able decode the message.
As stated earlier, the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel with a more noisy eaves-
dropper contains the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel which requires the eavesdrop-
per to be degraded with respect to all users as stated (3). Thus, we can specialize our
result in Theorem 1 to the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel as given in the following
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corollary whose proof is provided in Appendix A.2.
Corollary 1 The secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel is
given by the union of the rate tuples (R0, R1, . . . , RK) satisfying
R0 +
ℓ∑
k=1
Rk ≤
ℓ∑
k=1
I(Uk; Yk|Uk−1, Z), ℓ = 1, . . . , K (7)
where U0 = φ, UK = X , and the union is over all probability distributions of the form
p(u1)p(u2|u1) . . . p(uK−1|uK−2)p(x|uK−1) (8)
We acknowledge an independent and concurrent work regarding the degraded multi-
receiver wiretap channel. Reference [10] considers the two-user case and establishes the
secrecy capacity region as well.
So far we have determined the entire secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-
receiver wiretap channel with a more noisy eavesdropper. This class of channels requires a
certain degradation order among the legitimate receivers which may be viewed as being too
restrictive from a practical point of view. Our goal is to consider progressively more general
channel models. Towards that goal, in the next section, we consider channel models where
the users are not ordered in a degradedness or noisiness order. However, the concepts of de-
gradedness and noisiness are essential in proving capacity results. In the next section, we will
consider multi-receiver broadcast channels which are composed of independent sub-channels.
We will assume some noisiness properties in these sub-channels in order to derive certain ca-
pacity results. However, even though the sub-channels will have certain noisiness properties,
the overall broadcast channel will not have any degradedness or noisiness properties.
3 Parallel Multi-receiver Wiretap Channels
Here, we investigate the parallel multi-receiver wiretap channel where the transmitter com-
municates with K legitimate receivers using M independent sub-channels in the presence of
an eavesdropper, see Figure 3. The channel transition probability of a parallel multi-receiver
wiretap channel is
p
(
{y1m, . . . , yKm, zm}
M
m=1 | {xm}
M
m=1
)
=
M∏
m=1
p (y1m, . . . , yKm, zm|xm) (9)
where xm ∈ Xm is the input in the mth sub-channel where Xm is the corresponding channel
input alphabet, ykm ∈ Ykm (resp. zm ∈ Zm) is the output in the kth user’s (resp. eavesdrop-
per’s) mth sub-channel where Ykm (resp. Zm) is the kth user’s (resp. eavesdropper’s) mth
sub-channel output alphabet.
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In this section, we investigate special classes of parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels.
These channel models contain the class of channel models studied in [9] as a special case.
Similar to [9], our emphasis will be on the common message secrecy capacity and the sum
secrecy capacity.
3.1 The Common Message Secrecy Capacity
We first consider the simplest possible scenario where the transmitter sends a common con-
fidential message to all users. Despite its simplicity, the secrecy capacity of a common
confidential message (hereafter will be called the common message secrecy capacity) in a
general broadcast channel is unknown.
The common message secrecy capacity for a special class of parallel multi-receiver wiretap
channels was studied in [9]. In this class of parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels [9], each
sub-channel exhibits a certain degradation order which is not necessarily the same for all
sub-channels, i.e., the following Markov chain is satisfied
Xl → Yπl(1) → Yπl(2) → . . .→ Yπl(K+1) (10)
in the lth sub-channel, where (Yπl(1), Yπl(2), . . . , Yπl(K+1)) is a permutation of (Y1l, . . . , YKl, Zl).
Hereafter, we call this channel the parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel1. Al-
though [9] established the common message secrecy capacity for this class of channels, in
fact, their result is valid for the broader class in which we have either
Xl → Ykl → Zl (11)
or
Xl → Zl → Ykl (12)
valid for every Xl and for any (k, l) pair where k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, l ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Thus, it
is sufficient to have a degradedness order between each user and the eavesdropper in any
sub-channel instead of the long Markov chain between all users and the eavesdropper as in
(10).
Here, we focus on a broader class of channels where in each sub-channel, for any given
user, either the user’s channel is less noisy than the eavesdropper’s channel, or vice versa.
More formally, we have either
I(U ; Ykl) > I(U ;Zl) (13)
1In [9], these channels are called reversely degraded parallel channels. Here, we call them parallel degraded
multi-receiver wiretap channels to be consistent with the terminology used in the rest of the paper.
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or
I(U ; Ykl) < I(U ;Zl) (14)
for all U → Xl → (Ykl, Z) and any (k, l) pair where k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, l ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
Hereafter, we call this channel the parallel multi-receiver wiretap channel with a more noisy
eavesdropper. Since the Markov chain in (10) implies either (13) or (14), the parallel multi-
receiver wiretap channel with a more noisy eavesdropper contains the parallel degraded
multi-receiver wiretap channel studied in [9].
A (2nR, n) code for this channel consists of a message set,W0 = {1, . . . , 2
nR}, an encoder,
f :W0 → X
n
1 × . . .×X
n
M , K decoders, one at each legitimate receiver gk : Yk1× . . .×YkM →
W0, k = 1, . . . , K. The probability of error is defined as P
n
e = maxk=1,...,K Pr
[
Wˆk0 6=W0
]
where Wˆk0 is the kth user’s decoder output. The secrecy of the common message is measured
through the equivocation rate which is defined as 1
n
H(W0|Z
n
1 , . . . , Z
n
M). A common message
secrecy rate, R, is said to be achievable if there exists a code such that limn→∞ P
n
e = 0, and
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W0|Z
n
1 , . . . , Z
n
M) ≥ R (15)
The common message secrecy capacity is the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates.
The common message secrecy capacity of the parallel multi-receiver wiretap channel
with a more noisy eavesdropper is stated in the following theorem whose proof is given in
Appendix B.1.
Theorem 2 The common message secrecy capacity, C0, of the parallel multi-receiver wire-
tap channel with a more noisy eavesdropper is given by
C0 = max min
k=1,...,K
M∑
l=1
[
I(Xl; Ykl)− I(Xl;Zl)
]+
(16)
where the maximization is over all distributions of the form p(x1, . . . , xM) =
∏M
l=1 p(xl).
Remark 2 Theorem 2 implies that we should not use the sub-channels in which there is
no user that has a less noisy channel than the eavesdropper. Moreover, Theorem 2 shows
that the use of independent inputs in each sub-channel is sufficient to achieve the capac-
ity, i.e., inducing correlation between channel inputs of sub-channels cannot provide any
improvement.
As stated earlier, the parallel multi-receiver wiretap channel with a more noisy eavesdrop-
per encompasses the parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel studied in [9]. Hence,
we can specialize Theorem 2 to recover the common message secrecy capacity of the parallel
degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel established in [9]. This is stated in the following
corollary whose proof is given in Appendix B.2.
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Corollary 2 The common message secrecy capacity of the parallel degraded multi-receiver
wiretap channel is given by
C0 = max min
k=1,...,K
M∑
l=1
I(Xl; Ykl|Zl) (17)
where the maximization is over all distributions of the form p(x1, . . . , xM) =
∏M
l=1 p(xl).
3.2 The Sum Secrecy Capacity
We now consider the scenario where the transmitter sends an independent confidential mes-
sage to each legitimate receiver, and focus on the sum secrecy capacity. We consider a class
of parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels where the legitimate receivers and the eavesdrop-
per exhibit a certain less noisiness order in each sub-channel. These less noisiness orders are
not necessarily the same for all sub-channels. Therefore, the overall channel does not have
a less noisiness order. In the lth sub-channel, for all U → Xl → (Y1l, . . . , YKl, Zl), we have
I(U ; Yπl(1)) > I(U ; Yπl(2)) > . . . > I(U ; Yπl(K+1)) (18)
where (Yπl(1), Yπl(2), . . . , Yπl(K+1)) is a permutation of (Y1l, . . . , YKl, Zl). We call this channel
the parallel multi-receiver wiretap channel with a less noisiness order in each sub-channel.
We note that this class of channels is a subset of the parallel multi-receiver wiretap channel
with a more noisy eavesdropper studied in Section 3.1, because of the additional ordering
imposed between users’ sub-channels. We also note that the class of parallel degraded multi-
receiver wiretap channels with a degradedness order in each sub-channel studied in [9] is
not only a subset of parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels with a more noisy eavesdropper
studied in Section 3.1 but also a subset of parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels with a
less noisiness order in each sub-channel studied in this section.
A (2nR1 . . . , 2nRK , n) code for this channel consists ofK message sets,Wk = {1, . . . , 2
nRk},
k = 1, . . . , K, an encoder, f :W1×. . .×WK → X
n
1 ×. . .×X
n
M , K decoders, one at each legit-
imate receiver gk : Yk1× . . .×YkM →Wk, k = 1, . . . , K. The probability of error is defined as
P ne = maxk=1,...,K Pr
[
Wˆk 6= Wk
]
where Wˆk is the kth user’s decoder output. The secrecy is
measured through the equivocation rate which is defined as 1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WK |Z
n
1 , . . . , Z
n
M). A
sum secrecy rate, Rs, is said to be achievable if there exists a code such that limn→∞ P
n
e = 0,
and
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1, . . . ,WK |Z
n
1 , . . . , Z
n
M) ≥ Rs (19)
The sum secrecy capacity is defined to be the supremum of all achievable sum secrecy rates.
The sum secrecy capacity for the class of parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels with
a less noisiness order in each sub-channel studied in this section is stated in the following
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theorem whose proof is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 3 The sum secrecy capacity of the parallel multi-receiver wiretap channel with a
less noisiness order in each sub-channel is given by
max
M∑
l=1
[
I(Xl; Yρ(l)l)− I(Xl;Zl)
]+
(20)
where the maximization is over all input distributions of the form p(x1, . . . , xM) =
∏M
l=1 p(xl)
and ρ(l) denotes the index of the strongest user in the lth sub-channel in the sense that
I(U ; Ykl) ≤ I(U ; Yρ(l)l) (21)
for all U → Xl → (Y1l, . . . , YKl, Zl) and any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Remark 3 Theorem 3 implies that the sum secrecy capacity is achieved by sending infor-
mation only to the strongest user in each sub-channel. As in Theorem 2, here also, the use
of independent inputs for each sub-channel is capacity-achieving.
As mentioned earlier, since the class of parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels with a
less noisiness order in each sub-channel contains the class of parallel degraded multi-receiver
wiretap channels studied in [9], Theorem 3 can be specialized to give the sum secrecy capacity
of the latter class of channels as well. This result was originally obtained in [9]. This is
stated in the following corollary. Since the proof of this corollary is similar to the proof of
Corollary 2, we omit its proof.
Corollary 3 The sum secrecy capacity of the parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap chan-
nel is given by
max
M∑
l=1
I(Xl; Yρ(l)l|Zl) (22)
where the maximization is over all input distributions of the form p(x1, . . . , xM) =
∏M
l=1 p(xl)
and ρ(l) denotes the index of the strongest user in the lth sub-channel in the sense that
Xl → Yρ(l)l → Ykl (23)
for all input distributions on Xl and any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
So far, we have considered special classes of parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels for
specific scenarios and obtained results similar to [9], only for broader classes of channels. In
particular, in Section 3.1, we focused on the transmission of a common message, whereas in
Section 3.2, we focused on the sum secrecy capacity when only independent messages are
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transmitted to all users. In the subsequent sections, we will specialize our channel model,
but we will develop stronger and more comprehensive results. In particular, we will let
the transmitter send both common and independent messages, and we will characterize the
entire secrecy capacity region.
4 Parallel Degraded Multi-receiver Wiretap Channels
We consider a special class of parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap channels with two
sub-channels, two users and one eavesdropper. We consider the most general scenario where
each user receives both an independent message and a common message. All messages are
to be kept secret from the eavesdropper.
For the special class of parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap channels in consideration,
there is a specific degradation order in each sub-channel. In particular, we have the following
Markov chain
X1 → Y11 → Y21 → Z1 (24)
in the first sub-channel, and the following Markov chain
X2 → Y22 → Y12 → Z2 (25)
in the second sub-channel. Consequently, although in each sub-channel, one user is degraded
with respect to the other one, this does not hold for the overall channel, and the overall
channel is not degraded for any user. The corresponding channel transition probability is
p(y11|x1)p(y21|y11)p(z1|y21)p(y22|x2)p(y12|y22)p(z2|y12) (26)
If we ignore the eavesdropper by setting Z1 = Z2 = φ, this channel model reduces to the
broadcast channel that was studied in [23, 24].
A (2nR0, 2nR1, 2nR2 , n) code for this channel consists of three message sets, W0 = {1, . . . ,
2nR0},Wj = {1, . . . , 2
nRj}, j = 1, 2, one encoder f :W0×W1×W2 → X
n
1 ×X
n
2 , two decoders
one at each legitimate receiver gj : Y
n
j1 × Y
n
j2 →W0 ×Wj, j = 1, 2. The probability of error
is defined as P ne = maxj=1,2 Pr
[
gj(Y
n
j1, Y
n
j2) 6= (W0,Wj)
]
. A rate tuple (R0, R1, R2) is said to
be achievable if there exists a code such that limn→∞ P
n
e = 0 and
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(S(W )|Zn1 , Z
n
2 ) ≥
∑
k∈S(W )
Rk, ∀ S(W ) (27)
where S(W ) denotes any subset of {W0,W1,W2}. The secrecy capacity region is the closure
of all achievable secrecy rate tuples.
The secrecy capacity region of this parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel is
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characterized by the following theorem whose proof is given in Appendix D.1.
Theorem 4 The secrecy capacity region of the parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap
channel defined by (26) is the union of the rate tuples (R0, R1, R2) satisfying
R0 ≤ I(U1; Y11|Z1) + I(U2; Y12|Z2) (28)
R0 ≤ I(U1; Y21|Z1) + I(U2; Y22|Z2) (29)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X1; Y11|Z1) + I(U2; Y12|Z2) (30)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(X2; Y22|Z2) + I(U1; Y21|Z1) (31)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1; Y11|Z1) + I(U2; Y12|Z2) + I(X2; Y22|U2, Z2) (32)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(X2; Y22|Z2) + I(U1; Y21|Z1) + I(X1; Y11|U1, Z1) (33)
where the union is over all distributions of the form p(u1, u2, x1, x2) = p(u1, x1)p(u2, x2).
Remark 4 If we let the encoder use an arbitrary joint distribution p(u1, x1, u2, x2) instead
of the ones that satisfy p(u1, x1, u2, x2) = p(u1, x1)p(u2, x2), this would not enlarge the region
given in Theorem 4, because all rate expressions in Theorem 4 depend on either p(u1, x1) or
p(u2, x2) but not on the joint distribution p(u1, u2, x1, x2).
Remark 5 The capacity achieving scheme uses either superposition coding in both sub-
channels or superposition coding in one of the sub-channels, and a dedicated transmission in
the other one. We again note that this superposition coding is different from the standard
one [22] in the sense that it associates each message with many codewords by using stochastic
encoding at each layer of the code due to secrecy concerns.
Remark 6 If we set Z1 = Z2 = φ, we recover the capacity region of the underlying broadcast
channel [24].
Remark 7 If we disable one of the sub-channels, say the first one, by setting Y11 = Y21 =
Z1 = φ, the parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel of this section reduces to the
degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel of Section 2. The corresponding secrecy capacity
region is then given by the union of the rate tuples (R0, R1, R2) satisfying
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U2; Y12|Z2) (34)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(X2; Y22|U2, Z2) + I(U2; Y12|Z2) (35)
where the union is over all p(u2, x2). This region can be obtained through either Corollary 1
or Theorem 4 (by setting Y11 = Y21 = Z1 = φ and eliminating redundant bounds) implying
the consistency of the results.
Next, we consider the scenario where the transmitter does not send a common message,
and find the secrecy capacity region.
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Corollary 4 The secrecy capacity region of the parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap
channel defined through (26) with no common message is given by the union of the rate
pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(X1; Y11|Z1) + I(U2; Y12|Z2) (36)
R2 ≤ I(X2; Y22|Z2) + I(U1; Y21|Z1) (37)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1; Y11|Z1) + I(U2; Y12|Z2) + I(X2; Y22|U2, Z2) (38)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X2; Y22|Z2) + I(U1; Y21|Z1) + I(X1; Y11|U1, Z1) (39)
where the union is over all distributions of the form p(u1)p(u2)p(x1|u1)p(x2|u2).
Proof: Since the common message rate can be exchanged with any user’s independent mes-
sage rate, we set R0 = α + β,R
′
1 = R1 + α,R
′
2 = R2 + β where α, β ≥ 0. Plugging these
expressions into the rates in Theorem 4 and using Fourier-Moztkin elimination, we get the
region given in the corollary. 
Remark 8 If we disable the eavesdropper by setting Z11 = Z22 = φ, we recover the capacity
region of the underlying broadcast channel without a common message, which was found
originally in [23].
At this point, one may ask whether the results of this section can be extended to arbitrary
numbers of users and parallel sub-channels. Once we have Theorem 4, the extension of the
results to an arbitrary number of parallel sub-channels is rather straightforward. Let us
consider the parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel with M sub-channels, and in
each sub-channel, we have either the following Markov chain
Xl → Y1l → Y2l → Zl (40)
or this Markov chain
Xl → Y2l → Y1l → Zl (41)
for any l ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. We define the set of indices S1 (resp. S2) as those where for every
l ∈ S1 (resp. l ∈ S2), the Markov chain in (40) (resp. in (41)) is satisfied. Then, using
Theorem 4, we obtain the secrecy capacity region of the channel with two users and M
sub-channels as given in the following theorem which is proved in Appendix D.2.
Theorem 5 The secrecy capacity region of the parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap
channel with M sub-channels, where each sub-channel satisfies either (40) or (41) is given
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by the union of the rate tuples (R0, R1, R2) satisfying
R0 ≤
M∑
l=1
I(Ul; Y1l|Zl) (42)
R0 ≤
M∑
l=1
I(Ul; Y2l|Zl) (43)
R0 +R1 ≤
∑
l∈S1
I(Xl; Y1l|Zl) +
∑
l∈S2
I(Ul; Y1l|Zl) (44)
R0 +R2 ≤
∑
l∈S2
I(Xl; Y2l|Zl) +
∑
l∈S1
I(Ul; Y2l|Zl) (45)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤
∑
l∈S1
I(Xl; Y1l|Zl) +
∑
l∈S2
I(Ul; Y1l|Zl) +
∑
l∈S2
I(Xl; Y2l|Ul, Zl) (46)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤
∑
l∈S2
I(Xl; Y2l|Zl) +
∑
l∈S1
I(Ul; Y2l|Zl) +
∑
l∈S1
I(Xl; Y1l|Ul, Zl) (47)
where the union is over all distributions of the form
∏M
l=1 p(ul, xl).
We are now left with the question whether these results can be generalized to an arbitrary
number of users. If we consider the parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel with
more than two sub-channels and an arbitrary number of users, the secrecy capacity region
for the scenario where each user receives a common message in addition to an independent
message does not seem to be characterizable. Our intuition comes from the fact that, as of
now, the capacity region of the corresponding broadcast channel without secrecy constraints
is unknown [25]. However, if we consider the scenario where each user receives only an
independent message, i.e., there is no common message, then the secrecy capacity region
may be found, because the capacity region of the corresponding broadcast channel without
secrecy constraints can be established [25], although there is no explicit expression for it in
the literature. We expect this particular generalization to be rather straightforward, and do
not pursue it here.
5 Sum of Degraded Multi-receiver Wiretap Channels
We now consider a different multi-receiver wiretap channel which can be viewed as a sum
of two degraded multi-receiver wiretap channels with two users and one eavesdropper. In
this channel model, the transmitter has two non-intersecting input alphabets, i.e., X1,X2
with X1 ∩ X2 = ∅, and each receiver has two non-intersecting alphabets, i.e., Yj1,Yj2 with
Yj1 ∩ Yj2 = ∅ for the jth user, j = 1, 2, and Z1,Z2 with Z1 ∩ Z2 = ∅ for the eavesdropper.
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The channel is again memoryless with transition probability
p(y1, y2, z|x) =


p(y11|x1)p(y21|y11)p(z1|y21) if (x, y1, y2, z) ∈ X1 ×Y11 ×Y21 ×Z1
p(y22|x2)p(y12|y22)p(z2|y12) if (x, y1, y2, z) ∈ X2 ×Y21 ×Y22 ×Z2
0 otherwise
(48)
where x ∈ X = X1 ∪ X2, yj ∈ Yj = Yj1 ∪ Yj2, j = 1, 2 and z ∈ Z = Z1 ∪ Z2. Thus, if
the transmitter chooses to use its first alphabet, i.e., X1, the second user (resp. eavesdrop-
per) receives a degraded version of user 1’s (resp. user 2’s) observation. However, if the
transmitter uses its second alphabet, i.e., X2, the first user (resp. eavesdropper) receives a
degraded version of user 2’s (resp. user 1’s) observation. Consequently, the overall channel
is not degraded from any user’s perspective, however it is degraded from the eavesdropper’s
perspective.
A (2nR0, 2nR1, 2nR2 , n) code for this channel consists of three message sets, w0 ∈ W0 =
{1, . . . , 2nR0}, wj ∈ Wj = {1, . . . , 2
nRj}, j = 1, 2, one encoder f :W0 ×W1 ×W2 → X
n and
two decoders, one at each legitimate receiver, gj : Y
n
j →W0 ×Wj , j = 1, 2. The probability
of error is defined as P ne = maxj=1,2Pr
[
gj(Y
n
j ) 6= (W0,Wj)
]
. A rate tuple (R0, R1, R2) is
said to be achievable if there exists a code with limn→∞ P
n
e = 0 and
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(S(W )|Zn) ≥
∑
j∈S(W )
Rj , ∀ S(W ) (49)
where S(W ) denotes any subset of {W0,W1,W2}. The secrecy capacity region is the closure
of all achievable secrecy rate tuples.
The secrecy capacity region of this channel is given in the following theorem which is
proved in Appendix E.
Theorem 6 The secrecy capacity region of the sum of two degraded multi-receiver wiretap
channels is given by the union of the rate tuples (R0, R1, R2) satisfying
R0 ≤ αI(U1; Y11|Z1) + α¯I(U2; Y12|Z2) (50)
R0 ≤ αI(U1; Y21|Z1) + α¯I(U2; Y22|Z2) (51)
R0 +R1 ≤ αI(X1; Y11|Z1) + α¯I(U2; Y12|Z2) (52)
R0 +R2 ≤ αI(U1; Y21|Z1) + α¯I(X2; Y22|Z2) (53)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ αI(X1; Y11|Z1) + α¯I(U2; Y12|Z2) + α¯I(X2; Y22|U2, Z2) (54)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ αI(U1; Y21|Z1) + αI(X1; Y11|U1, Z1) + α¯I(X2; Y22|Z2) (55)
where the union is over all α ∈ [0, 1] and distributions of the form p(u1, u2, x1, x2) =
p(u1, x1)p(u2, x2).
Remark 9 This channel model is similar to the parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap
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channel of the previous section in the sense that it can be viewed to consist of two parallel
sub-channels, however now the transmitter cannot use both sub-channels simultaneously.
Instead, it should invoke a time-sharing approach between these two so-called parallel sub-
channels (α reflects this concern). Moreover, superposition coding scheme again achieves
the boundary of the secrecy capacity region, however it differs from the standard one [22] in
the sense that it needs to be modified to incorporate secrecy constraints, i.e., it needs to use
stochastic encoding to associate each message with multiple codewords.
Remark 10 An interesting point about the secrecy capacity region is that if we drop the
secrecy constraints by setting Z1 = Z2 = φ, we are unable to recover the capacity region of
the corresponding broadcast channel that was found in [24]. After setting Z1 = Z2 = φ, we
note that each expression in Theorem 6 and its counterpart describing the capacity region [24]
differ by exactly h(α). The reason for this is as follows. Here, α not only denotes the time-
sharing variable but also carries an additional information, i.e., the change of the channel
that is in use is part of the information transmission. However, since the eavesdropper can
also decode these messages, the term h(α), which is the amount of information that can be
transmitted via changes of the channel in use, disappears in the secrecy capacity region.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied secure broadcasting to many users in the presence of an eavesdrop-
per. Characterizing the secrecy capacity region of this channel in its most general form seems
to be intractable for now, since the version of this problem without any secrecy constraints,
is the broadcast channel with an arbitrary number of receivers, whose capacity region is
open. Consequently, we took the approach of considering special classes of channels. In
particular, we considered degraded multi-receiver wiretap channels, parallel multi-receiver
wiretap channels with a more noisy eavesdropper, parallel multi-receiver wiretap channels
with less noisiness orderings in each sub-channel, and parallel degraded multi-receiver wire-
tap channels. For each channel model, we obtained either partial characterization of the
secrecy capacity region or the entire region.
Appendices
A Proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
First, we show achievability, then provide the converse.
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A.1.1 Achievability
Fix the probability distribution as
p(u1)p(u2|u1) . . . p(uK−1|uK−2)p(x|uK−1) (56)
Codebook generation:
• Generate 2n(R0+R1+R˜1) length-n sequences u1 through p(u1) =
∏n
i=1 p(u1,i) and in-
dex them as u1(w0, w1, w˜1) where w0 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR0
}
, w1 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR1
}
and w˜1 ∈{
1, . . . , 2nR˜1
}
.
• For each uj−1, where j = 2, . . . , K−1, generate 2
n(Rj+R˜j) length-n sequences uj through
p(uj |uj−1) =
∏n
i=1 p(uj,i|uj−1,i) and index them as uj(w0, w1, . . . , wj, w˜1, . . . , w˜j) where
wj ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nRj
}
and w˜j ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR˜j
}
.
• Finally, for each uK−1, generate 2
n(RK+R˜K) length-n sequences x through p(x|uK−1) =∏n
i=1 p(xi|uK,i) and index them as x(w0, w1, . . . , wK, w˜1, . . . , w˜K) where wK ∈{
1, . . . , 2nRK
}
and w˜K ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR˜K
}
.
• Furthermore, we set
R˜i = I(Ui;Z|Ui−1), i = 1, . . . , K (57)
where U0 = φ and UK = X .
Encoding:
Assume the messages to be transmitted are (w0, w1, . . . , wK). Then, the encoder ran-
domly picks a set (w˜1, . . . , w˜K) and sends x(w0, w1, . . . , wK , w˜1, . . . , w˜K).
Decoding:
It is straightforward to see that if the following conditions are satisfied,
R0 +R1 + R˜1 ≤ I(U1; Y1) (58)
Rj + R˜j ≤ I(Uj ; Yj|Uj−1), j = 2, . . . , K − 1 (59)
RK + R˜K ≤ I(X ; YK |UK−1) (60)
then all users can decode both the common message and the independent message directed
to itself with vanishingly small error probability. Moreover, since the channel is degraded,
each user, say the jth one, can decode all of the independent messages intended for the users
whose channels are degraded with respect to the jth user’s channel. Thus, these degraded
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users’ rates can be exploited to increase the jth user’s rate which leads to the following
achievable region
R0 +
ℓ∑
j=1
Rj +
ℓ∑
j=1
R˜j ≤
ℓ∑
j=1
I(Uj ; Yj|Uj−1), ℓ = 1, . . . , K (61)
where U0 = φ and UK = X . Moreover, after eliminating
{
R˜j
}K
j=1
, (61) can be expressed as
R0 +
ℓ∑
j=1
Rj ≤
ℓ∑
j=1
I(Uj; Yj|Uj−1)− I(Uℓ;Z), ℓ = 1, . . . , K (62)
where we used the fact that
ℓ∑
j=1
R˜j =
ℓ∑
j=1
I(Uj;Z|Uj−1) = I(U1, . . . , Uℓ;Z) = I(Uℓ;Z) (63)
where the second and the third equalities are due to the following Markov chain
U1 → . . .→ UK−1 → X → Z (64)
Equivocation calculation:
We now calculate the equivocation of the code described above. To that end, we first
introduce the following lemma which states that a code satisfying the sum rate secrecy
constraint fulfills all other secrecy constraints.
Lemma 1 If the sum rate secrecy constraint is satisfied, i.e.,
1
n
H(W0,W1, . . . ,WK |Z
n) ≥
K∑
j=0
Rj − ǫn (65)
then all other secrecy constraints are satisfied as well, i.e.,
1
n
H(S(W )|Zn) ≥
∑
j∈S(W )
Rj − ǫn (66)
where S(W ) denotes any subset of {W0,W1, . . . ,WK}.
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Proof: The proof of this lemma is as follows.
1
n
H(S(W )|Zn) =
1
n
H(S(W ),Sc(W )|Zn)−
1
n
H(Sc(W )|S(W ), Zn) (67)
≥
K∑
j=0
Rj − ǫn −
1
n
H(Sc(W )|S(W ), Zn) (68)
=
∑
j∈S(W )
Rj − ǫn +
∑
j∈Sc(W )
Rj −
1
n
H(Sc(W )|S(W ), Zn) (69)
=
∑
j∈S(W )
Rj − ǫn +
1
n
H(Sc(W ))−
1
n
H(Sc(W )|S(W ), Zn) (70)
≥
∑
j∈S(W )
Rj − ǫn (71)
where (68) is due to the fact that we assumed that sum rate secrecy constraint (65) is satisfied
and (70) follows from
∑
j∈Sc(W )
Rj =
1
n
H(Sc(W )) (72)
which is a consequence of the fact that message sets are uniformly and independently dis-
tributed. 
Hence, it is sufficient to check whether coding scheme presented satisfies the sum rate
secrecy constraint.
H(W0,W1, . . . ,WK |Z
n) = H(W0,W1, . . . ,WK , Z
n)−H(Zn) (73)
= H(Un1 , . . . , U
n
K−1, X
n,W0,W1, . . . ,WK , Z
n)−H(Zn)
−H(Un1 , . . . , U
n
K−1, X
n|W0,W1, . . . ,WK , Z
n) (74)
= H(Un1 , . . . , U
n
K−1, X
n) +H(W0,W1, . . . ,WK , Z
n|Un1 , . . . , U
n
K−1, X
n)−H(Zn)
−H(Un1 , . . . , U
n
K−1, X
n|W0,W1, . . . ,WK , Z
n) (75)
≥ H(Un1 , . . . , U
n
K−1, X
n)− I(Un1 , . . . , U
n
K−1, X
n;Zn)
−H(Un1 , . . . , U
n
K−1, X
n|W0,W1, . . . ,WK , Z
n) (76)
where each term will be treated separately. Since given Unk = u
n
k , U
n
k+1 can take 2
n(Rk+1+R˜k+1)
values uniformly, the first term is
H(Un1 , . . . , U
n
K−1, X
n) = H(Un1 ) +
K−1∑
k=2
H(Unk |U
n
k−1) +H(X
n|UnK−1) (77)
= nR0 + n
K∑
k=1
Rk + n
K∑
k=1
R˜k (78)
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where the first equality follows from the following Markov chain
Un1 → U
n
2 → . . .→ U
n
K−1 → X
n (79)
The second term in (76) is
I(Un1 , . . . , U
n
K−1, X
n;Zn) = I(Xn;Zn) + I(Un1 , U
n
2 , . . . , U
n
K−1;Z
n|Xn) (80)
= I(Xn;Zn) (81)
≤ nI(X ;Z) + γn (82)
where (81) follows from the Markov chain in (79) and (82) can be shown by following
the approach devised in [2]. We now bound the third term in (76). To that end, as-
sume that the eavesdropper tries to decode
(
Un1 , . . . , U
n
K−1, X
n
)
using the side information
(W0,W1, . . . ,WK) which is equivalent to decoding
(
W˜1, . . . , W˜K
)
. Since R˜js are selected
to ensure that the eavesdropper can decode them successively, see (57), then using Fano’s
lemma, we have
H(Un1 , . . . , U
n
K−1, X
n|W0,W1, . . . ,WK , Z
n) ≤ ǫn (83)
Thus, using (78), (82) and (83) in (76), we get
H(W0,W1, . . . ,WK |Z
n) ≥ n
K∑
j=0
Rj + n
K∑
j=1
R˜j − nI(X ;Z)− ǫn (84)
= n
K∑
j=0
Rj − ǫn − γn (85)
where (85) follows from the following, see (57) and (63),
K∑
j=1
R˜j = I(X ;Z) (86)
A.1.2 Converse
First let us define the following auxiliary random variables,
Uk,i = W0W1 . . .WkY
i−1
k+1Z
n
i+1, k = 1, . . . , K − 1 (87)
which satisfy the following Markov chain
U1,i → U2,i → . . .→ UK−1,i → Xi → (Zi, YK,i, . . . , Y1,i) (88)
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To provide a converse, we will show
1
n
H(W0,W1, . . . ,Wℓ|Z
n) ≤
ℓ∑
k=1
I(Uk; Yk|Uk−1)− I(Uℓ;Z), ℓ = 1, . . . , K (89)
where U0 = φ, UK = X . We show this in three steps. First, let us write down
H(W0,W1, . . . ,Wℓ|Z
n) = H(W0,W1|Z
n) +
ℓ∑
k=2
H(Wk|W0,W1, . . . ,Wk−1, Z
n) (90)
The first term on the right hand side of (90) is bounded as follows,
H(W0,W1|Z
n) ≤ I(W0,W1; Y
n
1 )− I(W0,W1;Z
n) + ǫn (91)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)− I(W0,W1;Zi|Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1) + ǫn (92)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W1; Y1,i|Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)− I(W0,W1;Zi|Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)
+ I(Y i−11 , Z
n
i+1; Y1,i)− I(Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1;Zi) + ǫn (93)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y1,i)− I(W0,W1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1;Zi) + ǫn (94)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1; Y1,i)− I(W0,W1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1;Zi)
+ I(Y i−12 ; Y1,i|W0,W1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)− I(Y
i−1
2 ;Zi|W0,W1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1) + ǫn (95)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
2 ; Y1,i)− I(W0,W1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
2 ;Zi) + ǫn (96)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W1, Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
2 ; Y1,i)− I(W0,W1, Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
2 ;Zi) (97)
+ I(Y i−11 ; Y1,i|W0,W1, Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
2 )− I(Y
i−1
1 ;Zi|W0,W1, Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
2 ) + ǫn (98)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W1, Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
2 ; Y1,i)− I(W0,W1, Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
2 ;Zi) + ǫn (99)
=
n∑
i=1
I(U1,i; Y1,i)− I(U1,i;Zi) + ǫn (100)
where (91) follows from Fano’s lemma, (92) is obtained using Csiszar-Korner identity (see
Lemma 7 of [3]), (93) is due to the fact that
I(Y i−11 , Z
n
i+1; Y1,i)− I(Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1;Zi) > 0 (101)
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which follows from the fact that each user’s channel is less noisy with respect to the eaves-
dropper. Similarly, (95) follows from the fact that
I(Y i−12 ; Y1,i|W0,W1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1)− I(Y
i−1
2 ;Zi|W0,W1, Y
i−1
1 , Z
n
i+1) > 0 (102)
which is a consequence of the fact that each user’s channel is less noisy with respect to the
eavesdropper’s channel. Finally, (99) is due to the following Markov chain
Y i−11 → Y
i−1
2 →
(
W0,W1, Z
n
i+1, Y1,i, Zi
)
(103)
which is a consequence of the fact that the legitimate receivers exhibit a degradation order.
We now bound the terms of the summation in (90) for 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. Let us use the
shorthand notation, W˜k−1 = (W0,W1, . . . ,Wk−1), then
H(Wk|W˜k−1, Z
n) ≤ I(Wk; Y
n
k |W˜k−1)− I(Wk;Z
n|W˜k−1) + ǫn (104)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Wk; Yk,i|W˜k−1, Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1)− I(Wk;Zi|W˜k−1, Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1) + ǫn (105)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Wk; Yk,i|W˜k−1, Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1)− I(Wk;Zi|W˜k−1, Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1)
+ I(Y i−1k+1 ; Yk,i|W˜k−1, Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1,Wk)− I(Y
i−1
k+1 ;Zi|W˜k−1, Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1,Wk) + ǫn (106)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Wk, Y
i−1
k+1 ; Yk,i|W˜k−1, Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1)− I(Wk, Y
i−1
k+1 ;Zi|W˜k−1, Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1) + ǫn (107)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Uk,i; Yk,i|Uk−1,i)− I(Uk,i;Zi|Uk−1,i) + ǫn (108)
where (104) follows from Fano’s lemma, (105) is obtained through Csiszar-Korner identity,
and (106) is a consequence of the fact that
I(Y i−1k+1 ; Yk,i|W˜k−1, Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1,Wk)− I(Y
i−1
k+1 ;Zi|W˜k−1, Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1,Wk) > 0 (109)
which follows from the fact that each user’s channel is less noisy with respect to the eaves-
dropper’s channel. Finally, we bound the following term where we again use the shorthand
notation W˜K−1 = (W0,W1, . . . ,WK−1),
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H(WK |W˜K−1, Z
n) ≤ I(WK ; Y
n
K |W˜K−1)− I(WK ;Z
n|W˜K−1) + ǫn (110)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(WK ; YK,i|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1)− I(WK ;Zi|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1) + ǫn (111)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(WK ; YK,i|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1)− I(WK ;Zi|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1)
+ I(Xi; YK,i|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1,WK)− I(Xi;Zi|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1,WK) + ǫn (112)
=
n∑
i=1
I(WK , Xi; YK,i|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1)− I(WK , Xi;Zi|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1) + ǫn (113)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; YK,i|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1) + I(WK ; YK,i|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1, Xi)
− I(Xi;Zi|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1)− I(WK ;Zi|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1, Xi) + ǫn (114)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; YK,i|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1)− I(Xi;Zi|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1) + ǫn (115)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; YK,i|UK−1,i)− I(Xi;Zi|UK−1,i) + ǫn (116)
where (110) follows from Fano’s lemma, (111) is obtained by using Csiszar-Korner identity,
and (112) follows from the fact that
I(Xi; YK,i|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1,WK)− I(Xi;Zi|W˜K−1, Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1,WK) > 0 (117)
which is due to the fact that each user’s channel is less noisy with respect to the eavesdropper
and (115) is due to the Markov chain
(YK,i, Zi)→ Xi →
(
W0,W1, . . . ,WK , Y
i−1
K , Z
n
i+1
)
(118)
which follows from the fact that the channel is memoryless. Finally, plugging (100), (108)
and (116) into (90), we get
H(W0,W1, . . . ,Wℓ|Z
n) ≤ n
ℓ∑
k=1
I(Uk; Yk|Uk−1)− nI(Uℓ;Z), ℓ = 1, . . . , K (119)
where U0 = φ and UK = X , and this concludes the converse.
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A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
First, we note that
I(Uℓ;Z) = I(U1, . . . , Uℓ;Z) =
ℓ∑
k=1
I(Uk;Z|Uk−1) (120)
where the first equality is due to the following Markov chain
U1 → . . .→ UK−1 → X → Z (121)
By plugging (120) into (5), we get
R0 +
ℓ∑
k=1
Rk ≤
ℓ∑
k=1
I(Uk; Yk|Uk−1)− I(Uℓ;Z) (122)
=
ℓ∑
k=1
I(Uk; Yk|Uk−1)− I(Uk;Z|Uk−1) (123)
=
ℓ∑
k=1
I(Uk; Yk, Z|Uk−1)− I(Uk;Z|Uk−1) (124)
=
ℓ∑
k=1
I(Uk; Yk|Uk−1, Z) (125)
where (124) follows from the fact that the channel is degraded, i.e., we have the following
Markov chain
Uk−1 → Uk → Yk → Z (126)
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B Proofs of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Achievability of these rates follows from Proposition 2 of [9]. We provide the converse. First
let us define the following random variables,
Zn = (Zn1 , . . . , Z
n
M) (127)
Y nk = (Y
n
k1, . . . , Y
n
kM) (128)
Zni+1 =
(
Zn1,i+1, . . . , Z
n
M,i+1
)
(129)
Y i−1k =
(
Y i−1k1 . . . , Y
i−1
kM
)
(130)
Yk(i) = (Yk1(i), . . . , YkM(i)) (131)
Z(i) = (Z1(i), . . . , ZM(i)) (132)
where Y i−1kl = (Ykl(1), . . . , Ykl(i−1)), Z
n
l,i+1 = (Zl(i+ 1), . . . , Zl(n)). Start with the definition,
H(W0|Z
n) = H(W0)− I(W0;Z
n) (133)
≤ I(W0; Y
n
k )− I(W0;Z
n) + ǫn (134)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0; Yk(i)|Y
i−1
k )− I(W0;Z(i)|Z
n
i+1) + ǫn (135)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0, Z
n
i+1; Yk(i)|Y
i−1
k )− I(Z
n
i+1; Yk(i)|Y
i−1
k ,W0)
− I(W0, Y
i−1
k ;Z(i)|Z
n
i+1) + I(Y
i−1
k ;Z(i)|Z
n
i+1,W0) + ǫn (136)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0, Z
n
i+1; Yk(i)|Y
i−1
k )− I(W0, Y
i−1
k ;Z(i)|Z
n
i+1) + ǫn (137)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0; Yk(i)|Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1) + I(Z
n
i+1; Yk(i)|Y
i−1
k )
− I(W0;Z(i)|Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
k )− I(Y
i−1
k ;Z(i)|Z
n
i+1) + ǫn (138)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0; Yk(i)|Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1)− I(W0;Z(i)|Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
k ) + ǫn (139)
where (137) and (139) are due the following identities
n∑
i=1
I(Zni+1; Yk(i)|Y
i−1
k ,W0) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−1k ;Z(i)|Z
n
i+1,W0) (140)
n∑
i=1
I(Zni+1; Yk(i)|Y
i−1
k ) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−1k ;Z(i)|Z
n
i+1) (141)
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respectively, which are due to Lemma 7 of [3]. Now, we will bound each summand in (139)
separately. First, define the following variables.
Uk,i =
(
Zni+1, Y
i−1
k
)
(142)
Y˜ l−1k (i) =
(
Yk1(i), . . . , Yk(l−1)(i)
)
(143)
Z˜Ml+1(i) = (Zl+1(i), . . . , ZM(i)) (144)
Hence, the summand in (139) can be written as follows,
I(W0; Yk(i)|Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1)− I(W0;Z(i)|Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
k ) (145)
= I(W0; Yk(i)|Uk,i)− I(W0;Z(i)|Uk,i) (146)
= I(W0; Yk1(i), . . . , YkM(i)|Uk,i)− I(W0;Z1(i), . . . , ZM(i)|Uk,i) (147)
=
M∑
l=1
I(W0; Ykl(i)|Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i))− I(W0;Zl(i)|Uk,i, Z˜
M
l+1(i)) (148)
=
M∑
l=1
I(W0, Z˜
M
l+1(i); Ykl(i)|Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i))− I(Z˜
M
l+1(i); Ykl(i)|Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i),W0)
− I(W0, Y˜
l−1
k (i);Zl(i)|Uk,i, Z˜
M
l+1(i)) + I(Y˜
l−1
k (i);Zl(i)|Uk,i, Z˜
M
l+1(i),W0) (149)
=
M∑
l=1
I(W0, Z˜
M
l+1(i); Ykl(i)|Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i))− I(W0, Y˜
l−1
k (i);Zl(i)|Uk,i, Z˜
M
l+1(i)) (150)
=
M∑
l=1
I(Z˜Ml+1(i); Ykl(i)|Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i)) + I(W0; Ykl(i)|Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i), Z˜
M
l+1(i))
− I(Y˜ l−1k (i);Zl(i)|Uk,i, Z˜
M
l+1(i))− I(W0;Zl(i)|Uk,i, Z˜
M
l+1(i), Y˜
l−1
k (i)) (151)
=
M∑
l=1
I(W0; Ykl(i)|Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i), Z˜
M
l+1(i))− I(W0;Zl(i)|Uk,i, Z˜
M
l+1(i), Y˜
l−1
k (i)) (152)
where (150) and (152) follow from the following identities
M∑
l=1
I(Z˜Ml+1(i); Ykl(i)|Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i),W0) =
M∑
l=1
I(Y˜ l−1k (i);Zl(i)|Uk,i, Z˜
M
l+1(i),W0) (153)
M∑
l=1
I(Z˜Ml+1(i); Ykl(i)|Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i)) =
M∑
l=1
I(Y˜ l−1k (i);Zl(i)|Uk,i, Z˜
M
l+1(i)) (154)
respectively, which are again due to Lemma 7 of [3]. Now, define the set of sub-channels,
say S(k), in which the kth user is less noisy with respect to the eavesdropper. Thus, the
summands in (152) for l /∈ S(k) are negative and by dropping them, we can bound (152) as
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follows,
I(W0; Yk(i)|Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1)− I(W0;Z(i)|Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
k )
≤
∑
l∈S(k)
I(W0; Ykl(i)|Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i), Z˜
M
l+1(i))− I(W0;Zl(i)|Uk,i, Z˜
M
l+1(i), Y˜
l−1
k (i)) (155)
Moreover, for l ∈ S(k), we have
I(Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i), Z˜
M
l+1(i); Ykl(i))− I(Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i), Z˜
M
l+1(i);Zl(i)) ≥ 0
(156)
I(Xl(i); Ykl(i)|Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i), Z˜
M
l+1(i),W0)− I(Xl(i);Zl(i)|Uk,i, Z˜
M
l+1(i), Y˜
l−1
k (i),W0) ≥ 0
(157)
where both are due to the fact that for l ∈ S(k), in this sub-channel the kth user is less noisy
with respect to the eavesdropper. Therefore, adding (156) and (157) to each summand in
(155), we get the following bound,
I(W0; Yk(i)|Y
i−1
k , Z
n
i+1)− I(W0;Z(i)|Z
n
i+1, Y
i−1
k )
≤
∑
l∈S(k)
I(Xl(i),W0, Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i), Z˜
M
l+1(i); Ykl(i))− I(Xl(i),W0, Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i), Z˜
M
l+1(i);Zl(i))
(158)
=
∑
l∈S(k)
I(Xl(i); Ykl(i))− I(Xl(i);Zl(i)) (159)
where the equality follows from the following Markov chain
(
W0, Uk,i, Y˜
l−1
k (i), Z˜
M
l+1(i)
)
→ Xl(i)→ (Ykl(i), Zl(i)) (160)
which is a consequence of the facts that channel is memoryless and sub-channels are inde-
pendent. Finally, using (159) in (139), we get
H(W0|Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S(k)
I(Xl(i); Ykl(i))− I(Xl(i);Zl(i)) + ǫn (161)
≤ n
∑
l∈S(k)
I(Xl; Ykl)− I(Xl;Zl) + ǫn (162)
= n
M∑
l=1
[I(Xl; Ykl)− I(Xl;Zl)]
+ + ǫn (163)
which completes the proof.
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B.2 Proof of Corollary 2
We need to show that (16) reduces to (17) for parallel degraded multi-receiver wiretap
channels. Consider the kth user. If in the lth sub-channel, eavesdropper receives a degraded
version of the kth user’s observation, i.e., if the Markov chain in (11) is satisfied, then we
have
[I(Xl; Ykl)− I(Xl;Zl)]
+ = I(Xl; Ykl, Zl)− I(Xl;Zl) = I(Xl; Ykl|Zl) (164)
where the first equality is due to the Markov chain in (11). On the other hand, if in the lth
sub-channel, the kth user receives a degraded version of the eavesdropper’s observation, i.e.,
if the Markov chain in (12) is satisfied, then we have
[I(Xl; Ykl)− I(Xl;Zl)]
+ = [I(Xl; Ykl)− I(Xl;Zl, Ykl)]
+ = 0 = I(Xl; Ykl|Zl) (165)
where the first equality is due to the Markov chain in (12).
C Proof of Theorem 3
Achievability of Theorem 3 is a consequence of the achievability result for wiretap channels
in [3]. We provide the converse proof here. We first define the function ρ(l) which denotes
the index of the strongest user in the lth subchannel in the sense that
I(U ; Ykl) ≤ I(U ; Yρ(l)l) (166)
for all U → Xl → (Y1l, . . . , YKl, Zl) and any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Moreover, we define the
following shorthand notations
Y˜ nl = Y
n
ρ(l)l, l = 1, . . . ,M (167)
Y˜ n = (Y˜ n1 , . . . , Y˜
n
M) (168)
Y nk = (Y
n
k1, . . . , Y
n
kM), k = 1, . . . , K (169)
Zn = (Zn1 , . . . , Z
n
M) (170)
Y i−1k = (Y
i−1
k1 , . . . , Y
i−1
kM ), k = 1, . . . , K (171)
Z i−1 = (Z i−11 , . . . , Z
i−1
M ) (172)
Y˜ ni+1 = (Y˜
n
1,i+1, . . . , Y˜
n
M,i+1) (173)
Y l−1k (i) = (Yk1(i), . . . , Yk,l−1(i)), l = 1, . . . ,M (174)
Z l−1(i) = (Z1(i), . . . , Zl−1(i)), l = 1, . . . ,M (175)
Y˜ Ml+1(i) = (Y˜l+1(i), . . . , Y˜M(i)), l = 1, . . . ,M (176)
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We first introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For the parallel multi-receiver wiretap channel with less noisiness order, we have
I(Wk; Y
n
k ) ≤ I(Wk; Y˜
n), k = 1, . . . , K (177)
Proof: Consecutive uses of Csiszar-Korner identity [3], as in Appendix B.1, yield
I(Wk; Y
n
k )− I(Wk; Y˜
n) =
n∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
[
I(Wk; Ykl(i)|Y
i−1
k , Y˜
n
i+1, Y
l−1
k (i), Y˜
M
l+1(i))
−I(Wk; Y˜l(i)|Y
i−1
k , Y˜
n
i+1, Y
l−1
k (i), Y˜
M
l+1(i))
]
(178)
where each of the summand is negative, i.e., we have
I(Wk; Ykl(i)|Y
i−1
k , Y˜
n
i+1, Y
l−1
k (i), Y˜
M
l+1(i))− I(Wk; Y˜l(i)|Y
i−1
k , Y˜
n
i+1, Y
l−1
k (i), Y˜
M
l+1(i)) ≤ 0 (179)
because Y˜l(i) is the observation of the strongest user in the lth sub-channel, i.e., its channel
is less noisy with respect to all other users in the lth sub-channel. This concludes the proof
of the lemma. 
This lemma implies that
H(Wk|Y˜
n) ≤ H(Wk|Y
n
k ) ≤ ǫn (180)
where the second inequality is due to Fano’s lemma. Using (180), we get
H(W1, . . . ,WK |Y˜
n) ≤
K∑
k=1
H(Wk|Y˜
n) ≤ Kǫn (181)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy.
We now start the converse proof.
H(W1, . . . ,WK |Z
n) ≤ I(W1, . . . ,WK ; Y˜
n)− I(W1, . . . ,WK ;Z
n) +Kǫn (182)
=
n∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
[
I(W1, . . . ,WK ; Y˜l(i)|Z
i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i))
−I(W1, . . . ,WK ;Zl(i)|Z
i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i))
]
+Kǫn (183)
where (182) is a consequence of (181) and (183) is obtained via consecutive uses of the
Csiszar-Korner identity [3] as we did in Appendix B.1. We define the set of indices S such
that for all l ∈ S, the strongest user in the lth sub-channel has a less noisy channel with
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respect to the eavesdropper, i.e., we have
I(U ; Y˜l(i)) ≥ I(U ;Zl(i)) (184)
for all U → Xl(i) → (Y˜l(i), Zl(i)) and any l ∈ S. Thus, we can further bound (183) as
follows,
H(W1, . . . ,WK |Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S
[
I(W1, . . . ,WK ; Y˜l(i)|Z
i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i))
−I(W1, . . . ,WK ;Zl(i)|Z
i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i))
]
+Kǫn (185)
≤
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S
[
I(W1, . . . ,WK , Z
i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i); Y˜l(i))
−I(W1, . . . ,WK , Z
i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i);Zl(i))
]
+Kǫn (186)
≤
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S
[
I(Xl(i),W1, . . . ,WK , Z
i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i); Y˜l(i))
−I(Xl(i),W1, . . . ,WK , Z
i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i);Zl(i))
]
+Kǫn
(187)
=
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S
[
I(Xl(i); Y˜l(i))− I(Xl(i);Zl(i))
]
+Kǫn (188)
where (185) is obtained by dropping the negative terms, (186)-(187) are due to the following
inequalities
I(Z i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i); Y˜l(i)) ≥ I(Z
i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i);Zl(i)) (189)
I(Xl(i); Y˜l(i)|W1, . . . ,WK , Z
i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i)) ≥
I(Xl(i);Zl(i)|W1, . . . ,WK , Z
i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i)) (190)
which come from the fact that for any l ∈ S, the strongest user in the lth sub-channel has a
less noisy channel with respect to the eavesdropper. Finally, we get (188) using the following
Markov chain
(W1, . . . ,WK , Z
i−1, Y˜ ni+1, Z
l−1(i), Y˜ Ml+1(i))→ Xl(i)→ (Y˜l, Zl(i)) (191)
which is a consequence of the facts that channel is memoryless, and the sub-channels are
independent.
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D Proofs of Theorems 4 and 5
D.1 Proof of Theorem 4
We prove Theorem 4 in two parts, first achievability and then converse. Throughout the
proof, we use the shorthand notations Y n1 = (Y
n
11, Y
n
12), Y
n
2 = (Y
n
21, Y
n
22), Z
n
1 = (Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 ).
D.1.1 Achievability
To show the achievability of the region given by (28)-(33), first we need to note that the
boundary of this region can be decomposed into three surfaces as follows [24].
• First surface:
R0 ≤ I(U2; Y12|Z2) (192)
R2 ≤ I(X2; Y22|U2, Z2) (193)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X1; Y11|Z1) + I(U2; Y12|Z2), U1 = φ (194)
• Second surface:
R0 ≤ I(U1; Y21|Z1) (195)
R1 ≤ I(X1; Y11|U1, Z1) (196)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(X2; Y22|Z2) + I(U1; Y21|Z1), U2 = φ (197)
• Third surface:
R0 ≤ I(U1; Y11|Z1) + I(U2; Y12|Z2) (198)
R0 ≤ I(U1; Y21|Z1) + I(U2; Y22|Z2) (199)
R1 ≤ I(X1; Y11|U1, Z1) (200)
R2 ≤ I(X2; Y22|U2, Z2) (201)
We now show the achievability of these regions separately. Start with the first region.
Proposition 1 The region defined by (192)-(194) is achievable.
Proof: Fix the probability distribution
p(x1)p(u2)p(x2|u2)p(y1, y2, z|x) (202)
Codebook generation:
• Split the private message rate of user 1 as R1 = R11 +R12.
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• Generate 2n(R11+R˜11) length-n sequences x1 through p(x1) =
∏n
i=1 p(x1,i) and index
them as x1(w11, w˜11) where w11 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR11
}
and w˜11 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR˜11
}
.
• Generate 2n(R0+R12+R˜12) length-n sequences u2 through p(u2) =
∏n
i=1 p(u2,i) and index
them as u2(w0, w12, w˜12) where w0 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR0
}
, w12 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR12
}
and w˜12 ∈{
1, . . . , 2nR˜12
}
.
• For each u2, generate 2
n(R2+R˜2) length-n sequences x2 through p(x2|u2) =
∏n
i=1 p(x2,i|u2,i)
and index them as x2(w2, w˜2, w0, w12, w˜12) where w2 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR2
}
, w˜2 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR˜2
}
.
• Furthermore, set the confusion message rates as follows.
R˜11 = I(X1;Z1) (203)
R˜12 = I(U2;Z2) (204)
R˜2 = I(X2;Z2|U2) (205)
Encoding:
If (w0, w11, w12, w2) is the message to be transmitted, then the receiver randomly picks
(w˜11, w˜12, w˜2) and sends the corresponding codewords through each channel.
Decoding:
It is straightforward to see that if the following conditions are satisfied, then both users
can decode the messages directed to themselves with vanishingly small error probability.
R0 + R˜12 +R12 ≤ I(U2; Y12) (206)
R11 + R˜11 ≤ I(X1; Y11) (207)
R2 + R˜2 ≤ I(X2; Y22|U2) (208)
After eliminating R11 and R12 and plugging the values of R˜11, R˜12, R˜2, we can reach the
following conditions,
R0 ≤ I(U2; Y12|Z2) (209)
R2 ≤ I(X2; Y22|U2, Z2) (210)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X1; Y11|Z1) + I(U2; Y12|Z2) (211)
where we used the degradedness of the channel. Thus, we only need to show that this coding
scheme satisfies the secrecy constraints.
Equivocation computation:
33
As shown previously in Lemma 1 of Appendix A.1, checking the sum rate secrecy condi-
tion is sufficient.
H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n) = H(W0,W1,W2, Z
n)−H(Zn)
= H(W0,W1,W2, U
n
2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 , Z
n)−H(Un2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 |W0,W1,W2, Z
n)−H(Zn) (212)
= H(Un2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 ) +H(W0,W1,W2, Z
n|Un2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 )−H(Z
n)
−H(Un2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 |W0,W1,W2, Z
n) (213)
≥ H(Un2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 ) +H(Z
n|Un2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 )−H(Z
n)−H(Un2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 |W0,W1,W2, Z
n) (214)
We treat each term in (214) separately. The first term in (214) is
H(Un2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 ) = H(U
n
2 , X
n
2 ) +H(X
n
1 ) (215)
= n(R0 +R11 +R2 +R12 + R˜11 + R˜12 + R˜2) (216)
where the first equality is due to the independence of (Un2 , X
n
2 ) andX
n
1 , and the second equal-
ity is due the fact that both messages and confusion codewords are uniformly distributed.
The second and the third terms in (214) are
H(Zn)−H(Zn|Un2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 ) = H(Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 )−H(Z
n|Un2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 ) (217)
≤ H(Zn1 ) +H(Z
n
2 )−H(Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |U
n
2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 ) (218)
= H(Zn1 ) +H(Z
n
2 )−H(Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 |X
n
2 , X
n
1 ) (219)
= H(Zn1 ) +H(Z
n
2 )−H(Z
n
1 |X
n
1 )−H(Z
n
2 |X
n
2 ) (220)
= I(Xn1 ;Z
n
1 ) + I(X
n
2 ;Z
n
2 ) (221)
≤ nI(X1;Z1) + nI(X2;Z2) + γ1,n + γ2,n (222)
where the equalities in (219) and (220) are due to the following Markov chains
Un2 → X
n
2 → (X
n
1 , Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 ) (223)
Zn2 → X
n
2 → X
n
1 → Z
n
1 (224)
respectively, and the last inequality in (222) can be shown using the technique devised
in [2]. To bound the last term in (214), assume that the eavesdropper tries to decode
(Un2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 ) using the side information W0,W1,W2 and its observation. Since the rates
of the confusion codewords are selected such that the eavesdropper can decode them given
W0 = w0,W1 = w1,W2 = w2 (see (203)-(205)), using Fano’s lemma, we get
H(Un2 , X
n
2 , X
n
1 |W0,W1,W2, Z
n) ≤ ǫn (225)
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for the third term in (214). Plugging (216), (222) and (225) into (214), we get
H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n) ≥ n(R0 +R1 +R2)− ǫn − γ1,n − γ2,n (226)
which completes the proof. 
Achievability of the region defined by (195)-(197) follows due to symmetry. We now show
the achievability of the region defined by (198)-(201).
Proposition 2 The region described by (198)-(201) is achievable.
Proof: Fix the probability distribution as follows,
p(u1)p(x1|u1)p(u2)p(x2|u2)p(y1, y2, z|x) (227)
Codebook generation:
• Generate 2n(R0+R˜01) length-n sequences u1 through p(u1) =
∏n
i=1 p(u1,i) and index
them as u1(w0, w˜01) where w0 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR0
}
, w˜01 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR˜01
}
.
• For each u1, generate 2
n(R1+R˜1) x1(w0, w˜01, w1, w˜1) length-n sequences x1 through
p(x1) =
∏n
i=1 p(x1,i|u1,i) where w1 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR1
}
, w˜1 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR˜1
}
.
• Generate 2n(R0+R˜02) length-n sequences u2 through p(u2) =
∏n
i=1 p(u2,i) and index
them as u2(w0, w˜02) where w0 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR0
}
, w˜02 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR˜02
}
.
• For each u2, generate 2
n(R2+R˜2) x2(w0, w˜02, w2, w˜2) length-n sequences x2 through
p(x2) =
∏n
i=1 p(x2,i|u2,i) where w2 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR2
}
, w˜2 ∈
{
1, . . . , 2nR˜2
}
.
• Moreover, set the rates of confusion messages as follows,
R˜01 = I(U1;Z1) (228)
R˜02 = I(U2;Z2) (229)
R˜1 = I(X1;Z1|U1) (230)
R˜2 = I(X2;Z2|U2) (231)
Encoding:
Assume that the messages to be transmitted are (w0, w1, w2). Then, after randomly
picking the tuple (w˜01, w˜02, w˜1, w˜2), corresponding codewords are sent.
Decoding:
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Users decode w0 using their both observations. If w0 is the only message that satisfies
Ew0i1 = {∃w˜01 : (u1(w0, w˜01),yi1) ∈ A
n
ǫ } (232)
Ew0i2 = {∃w˜02 : (u2(w0, w˜02),yi2) ∈ A
n
ǫ } (233)
simultaneously for user i, w0 is declared to be transmitted. Assume w0 = 1 is transmitted.
The error probability for user i can be bounded as
Pr (Ei) ≤ Pr
((
E1i1, E
1
i2
)c)
+
2nR0∑
j=2
Pr
(
Eji1, E
j
i2
)
(234)
using the union bound. Let us consider the following
Pr
(
Eji1
)
= Pr (∃w˜01 : (u1(j, w˜01),yi1) ∈ A
n
ǫ ) (235)
≤
∑
∀w˜01
Pr ((u1(j, w˜01),yi1) ∈ A
n
ǫ ) (236)
≤ 2nR˜012−n(I(U1;Yi1)−ǫn) (237)
= 2n(R˜01−I(U1;Yi1)+ǫn) (238)
Similarly, we have
Pr
(
Eji2
)
≤ 2n(R˜02−I(U2;Yi2)+ǫn) (239)
Thus, the probability of declaring that the jth message was transmitted can be bounded as
Pr
(
Eji1, E
j
i2
)
= Pr
(
Eji1
)
× Pr
(
Eji2
)
(240)
≤ 2n(R˜01−I(U1;Yi1)+ǫn) × 2n(R˜02−I(U2;Yi2)+ǫn) (241)
= 2n(R˜01−I(U1;Yi1)+R˜02−I(U2;Yi2)+2ǫn) (242)
where the first equality is due to the independence of sub-channels and codebooks used for
each channel. Therefore, error probability can be bounded as
Pr (Ei) ≤ ǫn +
2nR0∑
j=2
2n(R˜01−I(U1;Yi1)+R˜02−I(U2;Yi2)+2ǫn) (243)
= ǫn + 2
n(R0+R˜01−I(U1;Yi1)+R˜02−I(U2;Yi2)+2ǫn) (244)
which vanishes if the following are satisfied,
R0 + R˜01 + R˜02 ≤ I(U1; Yi1) + I(U2; Yi2), i = 1, 2 (245)
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After decoding the common message, both users decode their private messages if the rates
satisfy
R1 + R˜1 ≤ I(X1; Y11|U1) (246)
R2 + R˜2 ≤ I(X2; Y22|U2) (247)
After plugging the values of R˜01, R˜02, R˜1, R˜2 given by (228)-(231) into (245)-(247), one can
recover the region described by (198)-(201) using the degradedness of the channel.
Equivocation calculation:
It is sufficient to check the sum rate constraint,
H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n) = H(W0,W1,W2, Z
n)−H(Zn) (248)
= H(Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 ,W0,W1,W2, Z
n)−H(Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 |W0,W1,W2, Z
n)
−H(Zn) (249)
= H(Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 ) +H(W0,W1,W2, Z
n|Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 )−H(Z
n)
−H(Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 |W0,W1,W2, Z
n) (250)
≥ H(Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 ) +H(Z
n|Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 )−H(Z
n)
−H(Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 |W0,W1,W2, Z
n) (251)
where each term will be treated separately. The first term is
H(Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 ) = H(U
n
1 , U
n
2 ) +H(X
n
1 |U
n
1 , U
n
2 ) +H(X
n
1 |U
n
1 , U
n
2 ) (252)
= n(R0 +R1 +R2 + R˜01 + R˜02 + R˜1 + R˜2) (253)
where we first use the fact that Xn1 and X
n
2 are independent given (U
n
1 , U
n
2 ) and secondly,
we use the fact that messages are uniformly distributed. The second and third term of (251)
are
H(Zn)−H(Zn|Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 ) = H(Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 )−H(Z
n
1 |X
n
1 )−H(Z
n
1 |X
n
2 ) (254)
≤ H(Zn1 ) +H(Z
n
2 )−H(Z
n
1 |X
n
1 )−H(Z
n
1 |X
n
2 ) (255)
= I(Xn1 ;Z
n
1 ) + I(X
n
2 ;Z
n
2 ) (256)
≤ nI(X1;Z1) + nI(X2;Z2) + γ1,n + γ2,n (257)
where the first equality is due to the independence of the sub-channels. We now consider
the last term of (251) for which assume that eavesdropper tries to decode (Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 )
using the side information (W0,W1,W2) and its observation. Since the rates of the confusion
messages are selected to ensure that the eavesdropper can decode (Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 ) given
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(W0 = w0,W1 = w1,W2 = w2) (see (228)-(231)), using Fano’s lemma we have
H(Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n
1 , X
n
2 |W0,W1,W2, Z
n) ≤ ǫn (258)
Plugging (253), (257) and (258) into (251), we have
H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n) ≥ n(R0 +R1 +R2)− ǫn − γ1,n − γ2,n (259)
which concludes the proof. 
D.1.2 Converse
First let us define the following auxiliary random variables,
U1,i = W0W2Y
n
12Y
i−1
11 Z
n
1,i+1 (260)
U2,i = W0W1Y
n
21Y
i−1
22 Z
n
2,i+1 (261)
which satisfy the following Markov chains
U1,i → X1,i → (Y11,i, Y21,i, Z1,i) (262)
U2,i → X2,i → (Y12,i, Y22,i, Z2,i) (263)
We remark that although U1,i and U2,i are correlated, at the end of the proof, it will turn out
that selection of them as independent will yield the same region. We start with the common
message rate,
H(W0|Z
n) = H(W0)− I(W0;Z
n) (264)
≤ I(W0; Y
n
1 )− I(W0;Z
n) + ǫn (265)
= I(W0; Y
n
1 |Z
n) + ǫn (266)
= I(W0; Y
n
12|Z
n) + I(W0; Y
n
11|Y
n
12, Z
n) + ǫn (267)
≤ I(W0,W1; Y
n
12|Z
n) + I(W0,W2; Y
n
11|Y
n
12, Z
n) + ǫn (268)
where (265) is due to Fano’s lemma, equality in (266) is due to the fact that the eavesdrop-
per’s channel is degraded with respect to the first user’s channel. We bound each term in
38
(268) separately. First term is
I(W0,W1; Y
n
12|Z
n) =
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W1; Y12,i|Y
i−1
12 , Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 ) (269)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y12,i|Y
i−1
12 , Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 )−H(Y12,i|Y
i−1
12 , Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 ,W0,W1) (270)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y12,i|Z2,i)−H(Y12,i|Y
i−1
12 , Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 ,W0,W1, Y
n
21, Y
i−1
22 ) (271)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y12,i|Z2,i)−H(Y12,i|W0,W1, Y
n
21, Y
i−1
22 , Z
n
2,i+1, Z2,i) (272)
=
n∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y12,i|Z2,i) (273)
where (271) follows from the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy and the equality
in (272) is due to the following Markov chains
Zn1 → Y
n
21 → (W0,W1, Y
n
22, Z
n
2 , Y
n
12) (274)
Y i−112 Z
i−1
2 → Y
i−1
22 →
(
W0,W1, Y
n
21, Y12,i, Z
n
2,i, Z
n
1
)
(275)
both of which are due to the fact that sub-channels are independent, memoryless and de-
graded. We now consider the second term in (268),
I(W0,W2; Y
n
11|Y
n
12, Z
n) =
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W2; Y11,i|Y
n
12, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , Y
i−1
11 ) (276)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W2; Y11,i|Y
n
12, Y
i−1
11 , Z
n
1,i+1, Z1,i) (277)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W2, Y
n
12, Y
i−1
11 , Z
n
1,i+1; Y11,i|Z1,i) (278)
=
n∑
i=1
I(U1,i; Y11,i|Z1,i) (279)
where (277) follows from the following Markov chains
Zn2 → Y
n
12 →
(
W0,W2, Y
i−1
11 , Z
n
1 , Y11,i
)
(280)
Z i−11 → Y
i−1
11 → (W0,W2, Y
n
12, Z
n
1,i+1, Z1,i, Y11,i) (281)
both of which are due to the fact that sub-channels are independent, memoryless and de-
graded. Plugging (273) and (279) into (268), we get the following outer bound on the
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common rate.
H(W0|Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y12,i|Z2,i) +
n∑
i=1
I(U1,i; Y11,i|Z1,i) + ǫn (282)
Using the same analysis on the second user, we can obtain the following outer bound on the
common rate as well.
H(W0|Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y22,i|Z2,i) +
n∑
i=1
I(U1,i; Y21,i|Z1,i) + ǫn (283)
We now bound the sum of independent and common message rates for each user,
H(W0,W1|Z
n) ≤ I(W0,W1; Y
n
1 )− I(W0,W1;Z
n) + ǫn (284)
= I(W0,W1; Y
n
1 |Z
n) + ǫn (285)
= I(W0,W1; Y
n
11, Y
n
12|Z
n) + ǫn (286)
= I(W0,W1; Y
n
12|Z
n) + I(W0,W1; Y
n
11|Y
n
12, Z
n) + ǫn (287)
where (284) is due to Fano’s lemma, (285) is due to the fact that the eavesdropper’s channel
is degraded with respect to the first user’s channel. Using (273), the first term in (287) can
be bounded as
I(W0,W1; Y
n
12|Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y12,i|Z2,i) (288)
Thus, we only need to bound the second term of (287),
I(W0,W1; Y
n
11|Y
n
12, Z
n) = H(Y n11|Y
n
12, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 )−H(Y
n
11|Y
n
12, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 ,W0,W1) (289)
≤ H(Y n11|Z
n
1 )−H(Y
n
11|Y
n
12, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 ,W0,W1, X
n
1 ) (290)
= H(Y n11|Z
n
1 )−H(Y
n
11|Z
n
1 , X
n
1 ) (291)
= I(Xn1 ; Y
n
11|Z
n
1 ) (292)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y11,i|Z1,i)−H(Y11,i|Z
n
1 , X
n
1 , Y
i−1
11 ) (293)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y11,i|Z1,i)−H(Y11,i|Z1,i, X1,i) (294)
=
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Y11,i|Z1,i) (295)
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where (290) is due to the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, (291) is due to the
following Markov chain
(Y n11, Z
n
1 )→ X
n
1 → (Y
n
12, Z
n
2 ,W0,W1) (296)
and (293) follows from the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy. Finally, (294) is
due to the fact that each sub-channel is memoryless. Hence, plugging (288) and (295) into
(287), we get the following outer bound.
H(W0,W1|Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Y11,i|Z1,i) +
n∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y12,i|Z2,i) + ǫn (297)
Similarly, for the second user, we can get the following outer bound,
H(W0,W2|Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(X2,i; Y22,i|Z2,i) +
n∑
i=1
I(U1,i; Y21,i|Z1,i) + ǫn (298)
We now bound the sum rates to conclude the converse,
H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n) = H(W0,W1,W2)− I(W0,W1,W2;Z
n) (299)
≤ I(W0,W1; Y
n
1 ) + I(W2; Y
n
2 |W0,W1)− I(W0,W1,W2;Z
n) + ǫn (300)
= I(W0,W1; Y
n
1 |Z
n) + I(W2; Y
n
2 |W0,W1, Z
n) + ǫn (301)
= I(W0,W1; Y
n
12|Z
n) + I(W0,W1; Y
n
11|Z
n, Y n12) + I(W2; Y
n
21|W0,W1, Z
n)
+ I(W2; Y
n
22|W0,W1, Z
n, Y n21) + ǫn (302)
= I(W0,W1, Y
n
21; Y
n
12|Z
n)− I(Y n21; Y
n
12|W0,W1, Z
n) + I(W0,W1; Y
n
11|Z
n, Y n12)
+ I(W2; Y
n
21|W0,W1, Z
n) + I(W2; Y
n
22|W0,W1, Z
n, Y n21) + ǫn (303)
= S1 − S2 + S3 + S4 + S5 (304)
where (300) follows from Fano’s lemma, (301) is due to the fact that the eavesdropper’s
channel is degraded with respect to both users’ channels, (303) is obtained by adding and
subtracting S2 from the first term of (302). Now, we proceed as follows.
S4 − S2 = I(W2; Y
n
21|W0,W1, Z
n)− I(Y n21; Y
n
12|W0,W1, Z
n) (305)
≤ I(W2, Y
n
12; Y
n
21|W0,W1, Z
n)− I(Y n21; Y
n
12|W0,W1, Z
n) (306)
= I(W2; Y
n
21|W0,W1, Z
n, Y n12) (307)
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Adding S3 to (307), we get
S3 + S4 − S2 ≤ I(W0,W1; Y
n
11|Z
n, Y n12) + I(W2; Y
n
21|W0,W1, Z
n, Y n12) (308)
≤ I(W0,W1; Y
n
11|Z
n, Y n12) + I(W2; Y
n
11, Y
n
21|W0,W1, Z
n, Y n12) (309)
= I(W0,W1; Y
n
11|Z
n, Y n12) + I(W2; Y
n
11|W0,W1, Z
n, Y n12)
+ I(W2; Y
n
21|W0,W1, Z
n, Y n12, Y
n
11) (310)
= I(W0,W1,W2; Y
n
11|Z
n, Y n12) + I(W2; Y
n
21|W0,W1, Z
n, Y n12, Y
n
11) (311)
where the second term is zero as we show next,
I(W2; Y
n
21|W0,W1, Z
n, Y n12, Y
n
11)
= H(W2|W0,W1, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , Y
n
12, Y
n
11)−H(W2|W0,W1, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , Y
n
12, Y
n
11, Y
n
21) (312)
= H(W2|W0,W1, Y
n
12, Y
n
11)−H(W2|W0,W1, Y
n
12, Y
n
11) = 0 (313)
where we used the following Markov chain
(W0,W1,W2)→ (Y
n
11, Y
n
12)→ (Y
n
21, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 ) (314)
which is a consequence of the degradation orders that sub-channels exhibit. Thus, (311) can
be expressed as
S3 + S4 − S2 ≤ I(W0,W1,W2; Y
n
11|Z
n, Y n12) (315)
= I(W0,W1,W2; Y
n
11|Z
n
1 , Y
n
12) (316)
≤ I(Xn1 ,W0,W1,W2; Y
n
11|Z
n
1 , Y
n
12) (317)
= I(Xn1 ; Y
n
11|Z
n
1 , Y
n
12) + I(W0,W1,W2; Y
n
11|Z
n
1 , Y
n
12, X
n
1 ) (318)
where (316) follows from the following Markov chain
Zn2 → Y
n
12 → (W0,W1,W2, Y
n
11, Z
n
1 ) (319)
which is due to the degradedness of the channel. Moreover, the second term in (318) is zero
as we show next,
I(W0,W1,W2; Y
n
11|Z
n
1 , Y
n
12, X
n
1 )
= H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n
1 , Y
n
12, X
n
1 )−H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n
1 , Y
n
12, X
n
1 , Y
n
11) (320)
= H(W0,W1,W2|Y
n
12, X
n
1 )−H(W0,W1,W2|Y
n
12, X
n
1 ) = 0 (321)
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where (321) follows from the following Markov chain
(Y n11, Z
n
1 )→ X
n
1 → (W0,W1,W2, Y
n
12) (322)
Thus, (318) turns out to be
S3 + S4 − S2 ≤ I(X
n
1 ; Y
n
11|Z
n
1 , Y
n
12) (323)
which can be further bounded as follows,
S3 + S4 − S2 ≤ H(Y
n
11|Z
n
1 , Y
n
12)−H(Y
n
11|Z
n
1 , Y
n
12, X
n
1 ) (324)
≤ H(Y n11|Z
n
1 )−H(Y
n
11|Z
n
1 , Y
n
12, X
n
1 ) (325)
= H(Y n11|Z
n
1 )−H(Y
n
11|Z
n
1 , X
n
1 ) (326)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Y11,i|Z1,i) (327)
where (325) is due to the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, (326) is due to the
following Markov chain
(Y n11, Z
n
1 )→ X
n
1 → Y
n
12 (328)
Finally, (327) is due to our previous result in (295). We keep bounding terms in (304),
S5 = I(W2; Y
n
22|W0,W1, Y
n
21, Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 ) (329)
= I(W2; Y
n
22|W0,W1, Y
n
21, Z
n
2 ) (330)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y22,i|W0,W1, Y
n
21, Z
n
2 , Y
i−1
22 ) (331)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y22,i|W0,W1, Y
n
21, Z
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1
22 , Z2,i) (332)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y22,i|U2,i, Z2,i) (333)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y22,i|U2,i, Z2,i)−H(Y22,i|U2,i, Z2,i,W2, X2,i) (334)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(X2,i; Y22,i|U2,i, Z2,i) (335)
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where (330) and (332) are due to the following Markov chains
Zn1 → Y
n
21 → (W0,W1,W2, Y
n
22, Z
n
2 ) (336)
Z i−12 → Y
i−1
22 →
(
W0,W1,W2, Y
n
21, Z
n
2,i, Y22,i
)
(337)
respectively, (334) follows from that conditioning cannot increase entropy and (335) is due
to the following Markov chain
(Y22,i, Z2,i)→ X2,i → (W2, U2,i) (338)
which is a consequence of the fact that each sub-channel is memoryless. Thus, we only need
to bound S1 in (304) to reach the outer bound for the sum secrecy rate,
S1 = I(W0,W1, Y
n
21; Y
n
12|Z
n) (339)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W0,W1, Y
n
21; Y12,i|Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , Y
i−1
12 ) (340)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y12,i|Z2,i)−H(Y12,i|Z
n
1 , Z
n
2 , Y
i−1
12 ,W0,W1, Y
n
21, Y
i−1
22 ) (341)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y12,i|Z2,i)−H(Y12,i|Z
n
2 , Y
i−1
12 ,W0,W1, Y
n
21, Y
i−1
22 ) (342)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y12,i|Z2,i)−H(Y12,i|W0,W1, Y
n
21, Y
i−1
22 , Z
n
2,i+1, Z2,i) (343)
=
n∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y12,i|Z2,i) (344)
where (341) is due to the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, (342) and (343)
follow from the following Markov chains
Zn1 → Y
n
21 →
(
W0,W1, Y
i−1
22 , Y
n
12, Z
n
2
)
(345)(
Y i−112 , Z
i−1
2
)
→ Y i−122 →
(
W0,W1,W2, Y
n
21, Z
n
2,i, Y12,i
)
(346)
respectively. Thus, plugging (327), (335) and (344) into (304), we get the following outer
bound on the sum secrecy rate.
H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Y11,i|Z1,i) + I(X2,i; Y22,i|U2,i, Z2,i) + I(U2,i; Y12,i|Z2,i) + ǫn
(347)
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Following similar steps, we can also get the following one
H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(X2,i; Y22,i|Z2,i) + I(X1,i; Y11,i|U1,i, Z1,i) + I(U1,i; Y21,i|Z1,i) + ǫn
(348)
So far, we derived outer bounds, (282), (283), (297), (298), (347), (348), on the capacity
region which match the achievable region provided. The only difference can be on the
joint distribution that they need to satisfy. However, the outer bounds depend on either
p(u1, x1) or p(u2, x2) but not on the joint distribution p(u1, u2, x1, x2). Hence, for the outer
bound, it is sufficient to consider the joint distributions having the form p(u1, u2, x1, x2) =
p(u1, x1)p(u2, x2). Thus, the outer bounds derived and the achievable region coincide yielding
the capacity region.
D.2 Proof of Theorem 5
D.2.1 Achievability
To show the achievability of the region given in Theorem 5, we use Theorem 4. First, we
group sub-channels into two sets Sj , j = 1, 2, where Sj, j = 1, 2, contains the sub-channels
in which user j has the best observation. In other words, we have the Markov chain
Xl → Y1l → Y2l → Zl (349)
for l ∈ S1, and we have this Markov chain
Xl → Y2l → Y1l → Zl (350)
for l ∈ S2.
We replace Uj with {Ul}l∈Sj , Xj with {Xl}l∈Sj , Yj1 with {Yjl}l∈S1, Yj2 with {Yjl}l∈S2, and
Zj with {Zl}l∈Sj , j = 1, 2, in Theorem 4. Moreover, if we select the pairs {(Ul, Xl)}
M
l=1 to be
mutually independent, we get the following joint distribution
p
(
{ul, xl, y1l, y2l, zl}
M
l=1
)
=
M∏
l=1
p(ul, xl)p(y1l, y2l, zl|xl) (351)
which implies that random variable tuples {(ul, xl, y1l, y2l, zl)}
M
l=1 are mutually independent.
Using this fact, one can reach the expressions given in Theorem 5.
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D.2.2 Converse
For the converse part, we again use the proof of Theorem 4. First, without loss of generality,
we assume S1 = {1, . . . , L1}, and S2 = {L1 + 1, . . . ,M}. We define the following auxiliary
random variables
U1,i = W0W2Y
n
1[L1+1:M ]Y
i−1
1[1:L1]
Zn[1:L1],i+1 (352)
U2,i = W0W1Y
n
2[1:L1]
Y i−12[L1+1:M ]Z
n
[L1+1:M ],i+1
(353)
which satisfy the Markov chains
U1,i → Xl,i → (Y1l,i, Y2l,i, Zl,i), l = 1, . . . , L1 (354)
U2,i → Xl,i → (Y1l,i, Y2l,i, Zl,i), l = L1 + 1, . . . ,M (355)
Using the analysis carried out for the proof of Theorem 4, we get
nR0 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(U1,i; Y1[1:L1],i|Z[1:L1],i) +
n∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y1[L1+1:M ],i|Z[L1+1:M ],i) + ǫn (356)
where each term will be treated separately. The first term can be bounded as follows
I(U1,i; Y1[1:L1],i|Z[1:L1],i) =
L1∑
l=1
I(U1,i; Y1l,i|Y1[1:l−1],i, Z[1:L1],i) (357)
=
L1∑
l=1
I(U1,i; Y1l,i|Y1[1:l−1],i, Z[l:L1],i) (358)
≤
L1∑
l=1
I(U1,i, Y1[1:l−1],i, Z[l+1:L1],i; Y1l,i|Zl,i) (359)
where (358) follows from the Markov chain
Z[1:l−1],i → Y1[1:l−1],i → (U1,i, Y1l,i, Z[l:L1],i) (360)
which is due to the degradedness of the sub-channels. To this end, we define the following
auxiliary random variables
Vl,i = Y1[1:l−1],iZ[l+1:L1],iU1,i, l = 1, . . . , L1 (361)
which satisfy the Markov chains
Vl,i → Xl,i → (Y1l,i, Y2l,i, Zl,i), l = 1, . . . , L1 (362)
46
Thus, using these new auxiliary random variables in (359), we get
I(U1,i; Y1[1:L1],i|Z[1:L1],i) ≤
L1∑
l=1
I(Vl,i; Y1l,i|Zl,i) (363)
We now bound the second term in (356) as follows,
I(U2,i; Y1[L1+1:M ],i|Z[L1+1:M ],i)
=
M∑
l=L1+1
I(U2,i; Y1l,i|Z[L1+1:M ],i, Y1[L1+1:l−1],i) (364)
=
M∑
l=L1+1
I(U2,i; Y1l,i|Z[l:M ],i, Y1[L1+1:l−1],i) (365)
≤
M∑
l=L1+1
H(Y1l,i|Zl,i)−H(Y1l,i|Z[l:M ],i, Y1[L1+1:l−1],i, U2,i) (366)
≤
M∑
l=L1+1
H(Y1l,i|Zl,i)−H(Y1l,i|Z[l:M ],i, Y1[L1+1:l−1],i, U2,i, Y2[L1+1:l−1],i) (367)
=
M∑
l=L1+1
H(Y1l,i|Zl,i)−H(Y1l,i|Z[l:M ],i, U2,i, Y2[L1+1:l−1],i) (368)
=
M∑
l=L1+1
I(Z[l+1:M ],i, U2,i, Y2[L1+1:l−1],i; Y1l,i|Zl,i) (369)
where (365) follows from the Markov chain
Z[L1+1:l−1],i → Y1[L1+1:l−1],i → (U2,i, Z[l:M ],i, Y1l,i) (370)
which is a consequence of the degradedness of the sub-channels, (366) and (367) follow from
the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, and (368) is due to the Markov chain
Y1[L1+1:l−1],i → Y2[L1+1:l−1],i → (U2,i, Z[l:M ],i, Y1l,i) (371)
which is again a consequence of the degradedness of the sub-channels. To this end, we define
the following auxiliary random variables
Vl,i = Y2[L1+1:l−1],iZ[l+1:M ],iU2,i, l = L1 + 1, . . . ,M (372)
which satisfy the Markov chains
Vl,i → Xl,i → (Y1l,i, Y2l,i, Zl,i), l = L1 + 1, . . . ,M (373)
47
Thus, using these new auxiliary random variables in (369), we get
I(U2,i; Y1[L1+1:M ],i|Z[L1+1:M ],i) ≤
M∑
l=L1+1
I(Vl,i; Y1l,i|Zl,i) (374)
Finally, using (363) and (374) in (356), we obtain
nR0 ≤
n∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
I(Vl,i; Y1l,i|Zl,i) + ǫn (375)
Due to symmetry, we also have
nR0 ≤
n∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
I(Vl,i; Y2l,i|Zl,i) + ǫn (376)
We now bound the sum of common and independent message rates. Using the converse
proof of Theorem 4, we get
n(R0 + R1) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(X[1:L1],i; Y1[1:L1],i|Z[1:L1],i) +
n∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y1[L1+1:M ],i|Z[L1+M ],i) + ǫn (377)
where, for the second term we already obtained an outer bound given in (374). We now
bound the first term,
I(X[1:L1],i; Y1[1:L1],i|Z[1:L1],i) =
L1∑
l=1
I(X[1:L1],i; Y1l,i|Z[1:L1],i, Y1[1:l−1],i) (378)
≤
L1∑
l=1
H(Y1l,i|Zl,i)−H(Y1l,i|Z[1:L1],i, Y1[1:l−1],i, X[1:L1],i) (379)
=
L1∑
l=1
H(Y1l,i|Zl,i)−H(Y1l,i|Zl,i, Xl,i) (380)
=
L1∑
l=1
I(Xl,i; Y1l,i|Zl,i) (381)
where (379) follows from the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, and (380) is due
to the following Markov chain
(Y1l,i, Zl,i)→ Xl,i → (X[1:l−1],i, X[l+1:L1],i, Y1[1:l−1],iZ[1:l−1],i, Z[l+1:L1],i) (382)
which follows from the facts that channel is memoryless and sub-channels are independent.
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Thus, plugging (374) and (381) into (377), we obtain
n(R0 +R1) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S1
I(Xl,i; Y1l,i|Zl,i) +
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S2
I(Vl,i; Y1l,i|Zl,i) + ǫn (383)
Due to symmetry, we also have
n(R0 +R1) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S2
I(Xl,i; Y2l,i|Zl,i) +
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S1
I(Vl,i; Y2l,i|Zl,i) + ǫn (384)
We now bound the sum secrecy rate. We first borrow the following outer bound from
the converse proof of Theorem 4,
n(R0 +R1 +R2) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(X[1:L1],i; Y1[1:L1],i|Z[1:L1],i) (385)
+
n∑
i=1
I(X[L1+1:M ],i; Y2[L1+1:M ],i|U2,i, Z[L1+1:M ],i) +
n∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y1[L1+1:M ],i|Z[L1+1:M ],i) (386)
where, for the first and third terms we already obtained outer bounds given in (381) and
(374), respectively. We now bound the second term as follows,
I(X[L1+1:M ],i; Y2[L1+1:M ],i|U2,i, Z[L1+1:M ],i)
=
M∑
l=L1+1
I(X[L1+1:M ],i; Y2l,i|U2,i, Z[L1+1:M ],i, Y2[L1+1:l−1],i) (387)
=
M∑
l=L1+1
I(X[L1+1:M ],i; Y2l,i|U2,i, Z[l:M ],i, Y2[L1+1:l−1],i) (388)
=
M∑
l=L1+1
I(X[L1+1:M ],i; Y2l,i|Vl,i, Zl,i) (389)
=
M∑
l=L1+1
H(Y2l,i|Vl,i, Zl,i)−H(Y2l,i|Vl,i, Zl,i, X[L1+1:M ],i) (390)
=
M∑
l=L1+1
H(Y2l,i|Vl,i, Zl,i)−H(Y2l,i|Vl,i, Zl,i, Xl,i) (391)
=
M∑
l=L1+1
I(Xl,i; Y2l,i|Vl,i, Zl,i) (392)
where (388) follows from the Markov chain
Z[L1+1:l−1],i → Y2[L1+1:l−1],i → U2,i, Z[l:M ],i, X[L1+1:M ],i, Y2l,i (393)
49
which is a consequence of the degradedness of the sub-channels, (389) is obtained via using
the definition of V2,i given in (372), and (391) follows from the Markov chain
(Zl,i, Y2l,i)→ Xl,i → (Vl,i, X[L1+1:l−1],i, X[l+1:M ]) (394)
which is due to the facts that channel is memoryless and sub-channels are independent.
Thus, plugging (374), (381) and (392) into (386), we get
n(R0 +R1 +R2) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S1
I(Xl,i; Y1l,i|Zl,i) +
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S2
I(Xl,i; Y2l,i|Vl,i, Zl,i)
+
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S2
I(Vl,i; Y1l,i|Zl,i) + ǫn (395)
Due to symmetry, we also have
n(R0 +R1 +R2) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S2
I(Xl,i; Y2l,i|Zl,i) +
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S1
I(Xl,i; Y1l,i|Vl,i, Zl,i)
+
n∑
i=1
∑
l∈S1
I(Vl,i; Y2l,i|Zl,i) + ǫn (396)
Finally, we note that all outer bounds depend on the distributions p(vl,i, xl,i, y1l,i, y2l,i, zl,i) =
p(vl,i, xl,i)p(y1l,i, y2l,i, zl,i|xl,i) but not on any joint distributions of the tuples (vl,i, xl,i, y1l,i, y2l,i,
zl,i) implying that selection of the pairs (vl,i, xl,i) to be mutually independent is optimum.
E Proof of Theorem 6
We prove Theorem 6 in two parts; first, we show achievability, and then we prove the
converse.
E.1 Achievability
Similar to what we have done to show the achievability of Theorem 4, we first note that
boundary of the capacity region can be decomposed into three surfaces [24].
• First surface:
R0 ≤ α¯I(U2; Y12|Z2) (397)
R2 ≤ α¯I(X2; Y22|U2, Z2) (398)
R0 +R1 ≤ αI(X1; Y11|Z1) + α¯I(U2; Y12|Z2), U1 = φ (399)
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• Second surface:
R0 ≤ αI(U1; Y21|Z1) (400)
R1 ≤ αI(X1; Y11|U1, Z1) (401)
R0 +R2 ≤ αI(U1; Y21|Z1) + α¯I(X2; Y22|Z2), U2 = φ (402)
• Third surface:
R1 ≤ αI(X1; Y11|U1, Z1) (403)
R2 ≤ α¯I(X2; Y22|U2, Z2) (404)
R0 ≤ αI(U1; Y11|Z1) + α¯I(U2; Y12|Z2) (405)
R0 ≤ αI(U1; Y21|Z1) + α¯I(U2; Y22|Z2) (406)
To show the achievability of each surface, we first introduce a codebook structure.
Codebook structure:
Fix the probability distribution as,
p(u1, x1)p(u2, x2)p(y1, y2, z|x) (407)
• Generate 2n(R01+R11+R˜11) length-n1 sequences u1 through p(u1) =
∏n1
i=1 p(u1,i) and index
them as u1(w01, w11, w˜11) where w01 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nR01}, w11 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nR11} and w˜11 ∈
{1, . . . , 2nR˜11}.
• For each u1, generate 2
n(R12+R˜12) length-n1 sequences x1 through p(x1) =∏n1
i=1 p(x1,i|u1,i) and index them as x1(w01, w11, w˜11, w12, w˜12) where w12 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nR12},
w˜12 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nR˜12}.
• Generate 2n(R02+R21+R˜21) length-(n − n1) sequences u2 through p(u2) =
∏n−n1
i=1 p(u2,i)
and index them as u2(w02, w21, w˜21) where w02 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nR02}, w21 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nR21}
and w˜21 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nR˜21}.
• For each u2, generate 2
n(R22+R˜22) length-(n − n1) sequences x2 through p(x2) =∏n−n1
i=1 p(x2,i|u2,i) and index them as x2(w02, w21, w˜21, w22, w˜22) where w22 ∈ {1, . . . ,
2nR22}, w˜22 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
nR˜22}.
• We remark that this codebook uses first channel n1 times and the other one (n− n1)
times. We define
α =
n1
n
(408)
and α¯ = 1− α.
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• Furthermore, we set
R˜11 = αI(U1;Z1) (409)
R˜12 = αI(X1;Z1|U1) (410)
R˜21 = α¯I(U2;Z2) (411)
R˜22 = α¯I(X2;Z2|U2) (412)
R1 = R11 +R12 (413)
R2 = R21 +R22 (414)
Encoding:
When the transmitted messages are (w01, w02, w11, w12, w21, w22), we randomly pick (w˜11,
w˜12, w˜21, w˜22) and send corresponding codewords.
Decoding:
Using this codebook structure, we can show that all three surfaces which determine the
boundary of the capacity region are achievable. For example, if we set U1 = φ (that implies
R01 = R11 = R˜11 = 0) and R21 = 0, then we achieve the following rates with vanishingly
small error probability.
R1 ≤ αI(X1; Y11|Z1) (415)
R0 ≤ α¯I(U2; Y12|Z2) (416)
R2 ≤ α¯I(X2; Y22|U2, Z2) (417)
Exchanging common message rate with user 1’s independent message rate, one can obtain
the first surface. Second surface follows from symmetry. For the third surface, we first set
R11 = R21 = 0. Moreover, we send common message in its entirety, i.e., we do not use a rate
splitting for the common message, hence we set R01 = R02 = R0, w01 = w02 = w0. In this
case, each user, say the jth one, decodes the common message by looking for a unique w0
which satisfies
Ew0j1 = {∃w˜01 : (u1(w0, w˜01),yj1) ∈ A
n
ǫ } (418)
Ew0j2 = {∃w˜02 : (u2(w0, w˜02),yj2) ∈ A
n
ǫ } (419)
(420)
Following the analysis carried out in (234)-(245), the sufficient conditions for the common
message to be decodable by both users can be found as
R0 ≤ αI(U1; Yj1|Z1) + α¯I(U2; Yj2|Z2), j = 1, 2 (421)
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After decoding the common message, each user can decode its independent message if
R1 ≤ αI(X1; Y11|U1, Z1) (422)
R2 ≤ α¯I(X2; Y22|U2, Z2) (423)
Thus, the third surface can be achieved with vanishingly small error probability. As of now,
we showed that all rates in the so-called capacity region are achievable with vanishingly small
error probability, however we did not claim anything about the secrecy conditions which will
be considered next.
Equivocation calculation:
To complete the achievability part of the proof, we need to show that this codebook
structure also satisfies the secrecy conditions. For that purpose, it is sufficient to consider
the sum rate secrecy condition.
H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) = H(W0,W1,W2, Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 )−H(Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) (424)
= H(W0,W1,W2, U
n1
1 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n1
1 , X
n−n1
2 , Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 )−H(Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 )
−H(Un11 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n1
1 , X
n−n1
2 |W0,W1,W2, Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) (425)
= H(Un11 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n1
1 , X
n−n1
2 ) +H(W0,W1,W2, Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 |U
n1
1 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n1
1 , X
n−n1
2 )
−H(Zn11 , Z
n−n1
2 )−H(U
n1
1 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n1
1 , X
n−n1
2 |W0,W1,W2, Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) (426)
≥ H(Un11 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n1
1 , X
n−n1
2 ) +H(Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 |U
n1
1 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n1
1 , X
n−n1
2 )
−H(Zn11 , Z
n−n1
2 )−H(U
n1
1 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n1
1 , X
n−n1
2 |W0,W1,W2, Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) (427)
where each term will be treated separately. The first term is
H(Un11 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n1
1 , X
n−n1
2 )
= H(Un11 , U
n−n1
2 ) +H(X
n1
1 |U
n1
1 ) +H(X
n−n1
2 |U
n−n1
2 ) (428)
= n(R0 +R11 + R˜11 +R21 + R˜21) + n(R12 + R˜12) + n(R22 + R˜22) (429)
= n(R0 +R1 +R2) + n1I(X1;Z1) + (n− n1)I(X2;Z2) (430)
where the first equality is due to the Markov chain
Xn11 → U
n1
1 → U
n−n1
2 → X
n−n1
2 (431)
The equality in (429) is due to the fact that (Un11 , U
n−n1
2 ) can take 2
n(R0+R11+R˜11+R21+R˜21)
values uniformly, and given Un11 (resp. U
n−n1
2 ), X
n1
1 (resp. X
n−n1
2 ) can take 2
n(R12+R˜12)
(resp. 2n(R22+R˜22)) values with equal probability. To reach (430), we use the definitions in
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(409)-(414). We consider the second and third terms in (427).
H(Zn11 , Z
n−n1
2 )−H(Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 |U
n1
1 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n1
1 , X
n−n1
2 )
≤ H(Zn11 ) +H(Z
n−n1
2 )−H(Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 |U
n1
1 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n1
1 , X
n−n1
2 ) (432)
= H(Zn11 ) +H(Z
n−n1
2 )−H(Z
n1
1 |X
n1
1 ) +H(Z
n−n1
2 |X
n−n1
2 ) (433)
= I(Xn11 ;Z
n1
1 ) + I(X
n−n1
2 ;Z
n−n1
2 ) (434)
≤ n1I(X1;Z1) + (n− n1)I(X2;Z2) + γ1,n + γ2,n (435)
where (432) is due to the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, (433) follows from
the Markov chain
Zn11 → X
n1
1 → U
n1
1 → U
n−n1
2 → X
n−n1
2 → Z
n−n1
2 (436)
and (435) can be shown using the technique devised in [2]. We bound the fourth term of
(427). To this end, assume that the eavesdropper tries to decode (Un11 , X
n1
1 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n−n1
2 )
given side information (W0 = w0,W1 = w1,W2 = w2). Since the confusion message rates are
selected to ensure that (see (409)-(412)) the eavesdropper can decode them as long as side
information is available. Consequently, use of Fano’s lemma yields
H(Un11 , U
n−n1
2 , X
n1
1 , X
n−n1
2 |W0,W1,W2, Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) < ǫn (437)
Finally, plugging (430),(435) and (437) into (427), we get
H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) ≥ n(R0 +R1 +R2)− ǫn − γ1,n − γ2,n (438)
which completes the achievability part of the proof.
E.2 Converse
First, let us define the following auxiliary random variables,
U1,i = W0W2Y
n−n1
12 Y
i−1
11 Z
n1
1,i+1, i = 1, . . . , n1 (439)
U2,i = W0W1Y
n1
21 Y
i−1
22 Z
n−n1
2,i+1 , i = 1, . . . , n− n1 (440)
where we assume that first channel is used n1 times. We again define
α =
n1
n
(441)
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We note that auxiliary random variables, U1,i, U2,i satisfy the Markov chains
U1,i → X1,i → (Y11,i, Y21,i, Z1,i) (442)
U2,i → X2,i → (Y21,i, Y22,i, Z2,i) (443)
Similar to the converse of Theorem 4, here again, U1,i and U2,i can be arbitrarily correlated.
However, at the end of converse, it will be clear that selection of them as independent would
yield the same region. Start with the common message rate,
H(W0|Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) (444)
≤ I(W0; Y
n1
11 , Y
n−n1
12 )− I(W0;Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) + ǫn (445)
= I(W0; Y
n1
11 , Y
n−n1
12 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) + ǫn (446)
= I(W0; Y
n−n1
12 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) + I(W0; Y
n1
11 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 , Y
n−n1
12 ) + ǫn (447)
≤ I(W0,W1; Y
n−n1
12 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) + I(W0,W2; Y
n1
11 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 , Y
n−n1
12 ) + ǫn (448)
where (445) is due to Fano’s lemma, (446) is due to the fact that the eavesdropper’s channel
is degraded with respect to the first user’s channel. Once we obtain (448), using the analysis
carried out in the proof of Theorem 4, we can obtain the following bounds.
I(W0,W1; Y
n−n1
12 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) ≤
n−n1∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y12,i|Z2,i) (449)
I(W0,W2; Y
n1
11 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 , Y
n−n1
12 ) ≤
n1∑
i=1
I(U1,i; Y11,i|Z1,i) (450)
where (449) (resp. (450)) can be derived following the lines from (269) (resp. (276)) to (273)
(resp. (279)). Thus, we have
H(W0|Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) ≤
n−n1∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y12,i|Z2,i) +
n1∑
i=1
I(U1,i; Y11,i|Z1,i) + ǫn (451)
and similarly, we can get
H(W0|Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) ≤
n−n1∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y22,i|Z2,i) +
n1∑
i=1
I(U1,i; Y21,i|Z1,i) + ǫn (452)
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We now consider the sum of common and independent message rates,
H(W0,W1|Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 )
≤ I(W0,W1; Y
n1
11 , Y
n−n1
12 )− I(W0,W1;Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) + ǫn (453)
= I(W0,W1; Y
n1
11 , Y
n−n1
12 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) + ǫn (454)
= I(W0,W1; Y
n−n1
12 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) + I(W0,W1; Y
n1
11 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 , Y
n−n1
12 ) + ǫn (455)
where (453) is due to Fano’s lemma, (454) follows from the fact that the eavesdropper’s
channel is degraded with respect to the first user’s channel. The first term of (455) is
already bounded in (449). The second term can be bounded as
I(W0,W1; Y
n1
11 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 , Y
n−n1
12 ) ≤
n1∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Y11,i|Z1,i) (456)
which can be obtained following the lines from (289) to (295). Hence, plugging (449) and
(456) into (455), we get
H(W0,W1|Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) ≤
n−n1∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y12,i|Z2,i) +
n1∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Y11,i|Z1,i) + ǫn (457)
Similarly, we can obtain
H(W0,W2|Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) ≤
n−n1∑
i=1
I(X2,i; Y22,i|Z2,i) +
n1∑
i=1
I(U1,i; Y21,i|Z1,i) + ǫn (458)
Finally, we derive the outer bounds for the sum secrecy rate,
H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) ≤ I(W0,W1; Y
n1
11 , Y
n−n1
12 ) + I(W2; Y
n1
21 , Y
n−n1
22 |W0,W1)
− I(W0,W1,W2;Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) + ǫn (459)
= I(W0,W1; Y
n1
11 , Y
n−n1
12 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) + I(W2; Y
n1
21 , Y
n−n1
22 |W0,W1, Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) + ǫn (460)
= I(W0,W1; Y
n−n1
12 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) + I(W0,W1; Y
n1
11 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 , Y
n−n1
12 )
+ I(W2; Y
n1
21 |W0,W1, Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) + I(W2; Y
n−n1
22 |W0,W1, Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 , Y
n1
21 ) + ǫn (461)
= I(W0,W1, Y
n1
21 ; Y
n−n1
12 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 )− I(Y
n1
21 ; Y
n−n1
12 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ,W0,W1)
+ I(W0,W1; Y
n1
11 |Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 , Y
n−n1
12 ) + I(W2; Y
n1
21 |W0,W1, Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 )
+ I(W2; Y
n−n1
22 |W0,W1, Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 , Y
n1
21 ) + ǫn (462)
= S1 − S2 + S3 + S4 + S5 + ǫn (463)
where in (459), we used Fano’s lemma and (460) follows from the fact that the eavesdropper’s
channel is degraded with respect to both users’ channels. We can again use the analysis
carried out in the converse proof of Theorem 4 to bound (463). For example, following lines
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from (305) to (327), we can obtain
S4 + S3 − S2 ≤
n1∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Y11,i|Z1,i) (464)
Similarly, if we follow the analysis from (329) to (335), we can get
S5 ≤
n−n1∑
i=1
I(X2,i; Y22,i|U2,i, Z2,i) (465)
and if we follow the lines from (339) to (344), we can get
S1 ≤
n−n1∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y12,i|Z2,i) (466)
Thus, plugging (464), (465) and (466) into (463), we get
H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) ≤
n1∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Y11,i|Z1,i) +
n−n1∑
i=1
I(U2,i; Y12,i|Z2,i)
+
n−n1∑
i=1
I(X2,i; Y22,i|U2,i, Z2,i) + ǫn (467)
Similarly, it can be shown that
H(W0,W1,W2|Z
n1
1 , Z
n−n1
2 ) ≤
n1∑
i=1
I(U1,i, Y21,i|Z2,i) +
n1∑
i=1
I(X1,i; Y11,i|U1,i, Z1,i)
+
n−n1∑
i=1
I(X2,i; Y22,i|Z2,i) (468)
So far, we derived outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region which match the achievable
region. Hence, to claim that this is indeed the capacity region, we need to show that
computing the outer bounds over all distributions of the form p(u1, x1)p(u2, x2) yields the
same region which we would obtain by computing over all p(u1, u2, x1, x2). Since all the
expressions involved in the outer bounds depend on either p(u1, x1) or p(u2, x2) but not on
the joint distribution p(u1, u2, x1, x2), this argument follows, establishing the secrecy capacity
region.
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